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Chapter 10 Discussion: Institutional Changes to Decentralised Governance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 measured the change of subnational autonomy after decentralisation in order 
to capture institutional changes toward decentralisation in Japan and Korea. In Chapter 7, 
8 and 9, in-depth case studies traced causality from ideas and interests prior to 
decentralisation to the degree of changes in subnational autonomy. Falleti (2016) claimed 
that it is possible to develop a theory by theoretically guided intensive – from after a 
cause and before the outcome of interests – process-tracing. She developed a sequential 
theory of decentralisation based on intensive process-tracing analyses – from prevailing 
territorial interests to the changes of subnational autonomy – focused on four Latin 
American countries. Yet, the author argues that more extensive approaches – connecting 
cause and outcome through one or more intervening variables – are needed because not 
only actors, institutions, and their interactions but also historical and structural factors 
have causal power to institutional changes toward decentralisation. 
Hence, this chapter aims at presenting extensive causal pathways to decentralised 
governance based on the four case studies of the first and the second wave of 
decentralisation in Japan and Korea. The first section outlines causal pathways to 
decentralised governance based on Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998:22): the answer for 
the third question – causal factors to determine the degree of changes in subnational 
autonomy – presented in Chapter 1. The second section presents ideological pathways to 
decentralised governance by synthesising the results of four cases. Following sections 
summarise the contributions and discuss the possible limitations of the thesis. Finally, this 
thesis concludes with suggestions for future studies.  
 
EXTENSIVE TRACING OF CAUSAL PATHWAYS 
Japan’s First Wave of Decentralisation 
In the later 1970s, ruling actors in Japan – the conservative LDP – perceived that the 
current Japanese tax system was not sustainable in an era of population ageing and low 
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growth. As globalisation intensified international competition, however, national 
government was not able to increase cooperation taxes which were the highest level in 
the world. Under these circumstances, Japan had two policy options – either streamlining 
government by decentralisation and privatisation, or introducing indirect taxes – to 
overcome economic and demographic crises. 
At first, ruling actors – the Ohira Administration in 1979 – attempted to tackle these 
economic and demographic issues by introducing a Consumption Tax. However, the Ohira 
Administration collapsed because of public backlash following the introduction of this 
new tax.  In Figure 10.1, structural changes at the macro-level changed the ruling actors’ 
interpretation of centralised governance as situational mechanisms. Facing economic and 
demographic changes, such as low economic growth and population ageing, ruling actors 
started to be sceptical about the sustainability of centralised governance (JA1; J5).   In 
order to reduce government debts, the Suzuki Administration took decentralisation and 
privatisation as means to streamline inefficiency in government (J5). At the micro level, as 
an action-formation mechanism, the ruling actors’ -scepticism about centralised Japanese 
administrative and fiscal governance shaped ruling actors’ preferences about the first 
wave of decentralisation which started with unfunded administrative decentralisation in 
1983.   
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As the first type of decentralisation, ruling actors transferred fiscal responsibility, mainly 
about compulsory education and social programmes, to subnational government in the 
name of fiscal reconstruction in 1983. As the second type of decentralisation, ruling actors 
transferred administrative authority over residential care services to subnational 
government in 1986. As the third type of decentralisation, ruling actors transferred fiscal 
resources to subnational government. As the fourth type of decentralisation, ruling actors 
transferred administrative authority of community care services to subnational 
government in 1990. As the last type of decentralisation, ruling actors implemented a 
small measure of political decentralisation in 1991.  
As a transformational mechanism, Japan shifted to more decentralised governance after 
the first wave of decentralisation. However, the degree was not substantial (Table 6.5). 
Subnational autonomy of compulsory education policy increased by ‘1’ (from 48 to 49) 
whilst subnational autonomy of long-term care increased by ‘3’ (from 44 to 47). The 
increased subnational autonomy was mainly attributed to the increased subnational fiscal 
capacity. For instance, in compulsory education policy, subnational fiscal capacity 
increased significantly but subnational political, administrative and organisational 
capacity did not increase. In long-term care insurance, subnational fiscal capacity 
increased significantly and subnational administrative capacity increased moderately. Yet, 
subnational political and organisational capacity did not increase.  
Although Falleti (2010) explains the low degree of change in subnational autonomy by the 
reinforcing mechanisms of prevailing national territorial interests, these results raised 
two questions. First, did the increased subnational fiscal capacity result from the first 
wave of decentralisation? Second, why did administrative capacity of long-term care 
services increased but that of compulsory education remained static?  
‘No’ is the answer of the first question. The increased subnational share of revenues was 
the main factor to enhance subnational fiscal capacity during the first wave of 
decentralisation (see Table 6.5). Subnational Share of Revenue (SSR) increased from 39% 
(1980) to 46.6% (1994) and Subnational Share of Expenditure (SSE) increased from 64.5% 
(1980) to 67.1% (1995). Subnational Discretion on fiscal rules did not change. If this 
substantially increased subnational fiscal capacity resulted from fiscal decentralisation in 
1989 – the introduction of Consumption Taxes and the following increase of 
intergovernmental transfers –, it is the SSE that should have increased instead of SSR.  
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Thus, the increased subnational fiscal capacity did not result from the first wave of 
decentralisation. In fact, the Bubble Economy in the 1980s increased subnational 
revenues as subnational taxes mainly consist of an Inheritance Tax, a Business Tax, and a 
Fixed Asset Tax (JMIAC 1996). As a macro-level mechanism, the Bubble Economy – the 
increased value of real estates and the booming business transactions – had causal power 
to the high degree of change in subnational fiscal capacity.  
For the second question, population ageing and historical legacies had causal power to 
uneven changes of subnational administrative capacity in compulsory education and 
elderly-care systems. First, during the first wave of decentralisation, ruling actors 
transferred administrative authority and responsibility of social care services because 
population ageing was anticipated to increase social expenditure for the elderly. In 
contrast, national actors had no material incentive to transfer administrative authority of 
compulsory education as population ageing is expectedd to decrease the number of 
pupils and consequently decrease compulsory education expenditure.  
Second, historical legacies had causal power to uneven changes of subnational autonomy 
in compulsory education and elderly-care systems. In compulsory education policy, up to 
the end of the Cold War, Nykkyoso had stood against centralised governance as they 
thought that a centralised militaristic education brought about the Second World War 
and the sacrifice of young students (Aspinall 2001). As Nykkyoso had strong power in 
subnational Boards of Education, national government did not want to transfer the 
policy-making authority, a component of administrative capacity, to subnational 
government. As ideological contestations and unionisation of labours in social care areas 
developed, national actors transferred the policy-making authority of social care systems 
to subnational government. 
In conclusion, economic and demographic changes in the late 1970s shaped ruling actors’ 
awareness about unsustainability of centralised governance. Alongside this 
acknowledgement also shaping ruling actors’ preferences toward decentralisation, the 
hostile public consensus about tax-hikes, national government had only policy options of 
decentralisation and privatisation. Returning to the third question in Chapter 3, what 
determines the degree of change in subnational autonomy was the ruling actors’ 
awareness of the unsustainability of centralised governance. The economic recession in 
the late 1970s, which resulted in unfunded administrative decentralisation in order to 
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reduce government debts and transferring administrative responsibility to subnational 
governments, brought about the low degree of change in subnational autonomy.  
Japan’s Second Wave of Decentralisation 
After the first wave of decentralisation, the LDP Administration lost it power and the 
Hosokawa Administration, the first non-LDP Cabinet in 38 years, was established in 1993. 
During 1993-1996, non-LDP Prime Ministers, Hosokawa and Murayama, set 
decentralisation, aiming at not streamlining inefficient government but enhancing local 
self-governance, as the main political agenda. First of all, in 1993, eight opposition parties 
agreed to promote decentralisation, and the Japanese Diet – the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors – resolved to promote decentralisation. In 
1993, subnational associations gained a legal right to present their opinions to national 
government as a policy partner. In 1994, the LDP agreed to the Decentralisation 
Framework drafted by the JSP and the Sakigake.  
Under these political arrangements, as the first type of decentralisation, the Murayama 
Administration implemented fiscal decentralisation of introducing the Subnational 
Consumption Tax in 1997. After observing the failure of Hosokawa’s social welfare tax, 
Murayama took time to persuade actors opposed to this indirect tax-hike such as other 
parties and grassroots public movements. The tax-hike took place as a form of fiscal 
decentralisation in order to persuade other parties opposed to an indirect tax-hike with 
the agenda of decentralisation (Nakamura 2014; Sakamoto 1999).  Falleti’s (2010) theory 
explains why the second wave of decentralisation in Japan started with fiscal 
decentralisation. As the Murayama Administration was a coalition administration of JSP 
and LDP, fiscal decentralisation rather than political decentralisation was more likely to 
take place as the first type of decentralisation. As a situational mechanism, the regime 
change from LDP to non-LDP cabinets provided a political opportunity to promote 
decentralisation in order to enhance subnational self-governance.  
At the same time, as a situational mechanism, the regime change from LDP to non-LDP 
cabinets provided a political opportunity to establish the Decentralisation Promotion 
Committee. Administrative decentralisation was discussed in a third party organisation of 
the Decentralisation Promotion Committee. According to the Decentralisation Framework, 
in 1995, the Decentralisation Promotion Committee was established to supervise the 
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implementation of decentralisation reforms. In addition, the Decentralisation Promotion 
Committee reviewed decentralisation agendas and gathered public opinions via public 
consultation and closed-door meetings. After all, the Decentralisation Promotion 
Committee decided to abolish the agency-delegation system in 1999 which saw 
administrative authority transferred to subnational government. By abolishing the 
agency-delegation system, the hierarchical intergovernmental relations ceased and 
subnational government were regarded as policy partners.  As an action-formation 
mechanism, the Decentralisation Promotion Committee ended the hierarchical 
intergovernmental relationship in 1999 by abolishing the agency-delegation system (see 
Figure 10.2).  
In 1996, LDP returned to power as the centre of the ruling party after Hashimoto became 
Prime Minister. The Hashimoto and the following Koizumi Administrations promoted 
deregulation and decentralisation based on a neoliberal policy paradigm of small 
government.  For instance, the Hashimoto Administration (1996-1998) focused on 
streamlining national government by reducing 22 government ministries and agencies to 
one Cabinet Office and 12 central ministries central ministries. At the subnational level, 
from 1999, municipal mergers were implemented in order to increase economies of scale. 
In this vein, decentralisation during 2003-2006 was focused on enhancing managerial 
efficiency via decentralisation rather than enhancing subnational self-governance.  
The following Koizumi Administration (2000-2006) continued decentralisation reforms 
based on neoliberal policy paradigm of small government.  For instance, as the third 
decentralisation reform, the Koizumi Administration transferred administrative 
authorities and fiscal responsibilities to subnational government during 2003 – 2006 
which was called the Trinity Reforms. In order to overcome economic recession and 
reduce government-debts, the Koizumi Administration drove decentralisation aiming at 
enhancing managerial efficiency via decentralisation rather than enhancing subnational 
self-governance.  
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During the first wave of decentralisation in Japan, subnational autonomy of social care 
services increased more than that of compulsory education services. Discussions in the 
previous section explained this by the demographic changes to an aged society and the 
existence of teacher labour unions in Japan. However, decentralisation reforms during 
the second wave of decentralisation transferred significant administrative authorities and 
responsibilities to subnational government. The demise of right and left conflicts in the 
1990s and the Koizumi Administration’s neoliberal policy paradigm pursuing small 
government created a favourable environment to transfer mayors and governors 
authorities to appoint Superintendents of Education without consent from the JMOE in 
2000. Furthermore, the authority to decide the level of teacher’s salary was transferred 
to subnational government in 2004. The increased subnational autonomy during the 
second wave of decentralisation demonstrates the ideological foothold behind 
decentralisation reforms, in this case, the neoliberal policy paradigm, has casual power to 
decide the level of changes in subnational autonomy. Also, the favourable political 
environments created by the demise of right and left conflicts. Nykkyoso was gradually 
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losing significance and less emphasis was placed on preserving the culture and power of 
left-wing unions.  
In the same vein, Japan introduced a local government centred Long-Term Care Insurance 
system in 2000. As the authority and responsibility of social care services were 
transferred in 1990, Japan was able to establish its long-term care insurance system, 
which gives subnational government extensive authorities over the management and 
delivery of long-term care services. In sum, as an action-formation mechanism, LDP prime 
ministers (1996-2006) with neoliberal policy paradigms favouring small government 
planned and implemented administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms in order to 
streamline government organisations and enhance managerial efficiency (see Figure 10.2). 
As a transformational mechanism, Japan shifted to more decentralised governance after 
the second wave of decentralisation. As can be seen in Table 6.5, subnational autonomy 
of compulsory education policy increased by ‘9’ (from 49 to 59) and that of long-term 
care also increased by ‘9’ (from 47 to 56). Except subnational political capacity, 
administrative, fiscal, and organisational capacity increased substantially. The degree of 
changes in each domain of subnational autonomy clearly demonstrates the causal power 
of the neoliberal policy paradigms pursuing small government.   
Subnational political capacity decreased by ‘8’ (from 36 to 28). After the agency-
delegation system was abolished in 2000, national government increased administrative 
measures to control subnational government to ensure subnational compliance about 
commissioned affairs. This clearly demonstrates that decentralisation reforms do not 
always increase subnational autonomy in all dimensions. Therefore, some scholars argue 
that the abolition of the agency-delegation system had only a symbolic meaning as it 
decreased subnational political autonomy (J20).  
Finally, as a macro-level mechanism, the introduction of Long-Term Care Insurance in 
2000 increased subnational administrative capacity in Japan. As the authority and 
responsibility of social care services were given to subnational government, the expansion 
of long-term care services increased subnational autonomy.  
In conclusion, the ideological ground of the second wave of decentralisation moved from 
the enhancement of subnational self-governance to neoliberal policy paradigm of small 
government. As non-LDP prime ministers who regarded decentralisation as a means to 
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improve subnational self-governance were in power for less than three years, the LDP 
prime ministers, Hashimoto and Koizumi, had substantial influence to control types and 
speed of decentralisation reforms.   
To sum up, the periodic comparison between the first and second wave of 
decentralisation in Japan demonstrates the ideological causal pathways to the degree of 
changes in subnational autonomy. During Japan’s first wave of decentralisation, as 
national actors’ preferences were anchored in the ideological contention of the Cold War, 
national actors were unable to transfer administrative authority to subnational 
government. However, the end of the Cold War rendered the ideological contentions 
between Nykkoso and the JMOE obsolete. In 1987, Nykkoso separated into two 
organisations of Nykkoso and Zenkyo (All Japan Teacher and Staff Union). After that point, 
Nykkoso started to take a more moderate stance and cooperated with the JMOE (Aspinall 
2001). As Nykkoso changed its ideological platform from anti-government to neutral, 
national government was able to transfer substantial authorities to subnational 
government without concern about generating heated ideological debates.  
In contrast, during the second wave of decentralisation, national government also started 
to perceive that centralised governance was not able to respond efficiently to bullying 
and violence in schools (J16). In the same vein, the JMOE was required to transfer the 
political authority to control Boards of Education of agency-delegation system. Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s neoliberal preference pushed the JMOE to transfer administrative 
authority in order to enhance managerial efficiency and accountability. In Japan, a 
neoliberal policy paradigm contributed to increase subnational administrative and fiscal 
capacity because it attempts to enhance the quality of public service delivery by aligning 
authority and responsibility. 
In conclusion, as national and education actors changed their ideas with the course of 
time, in compulsory education policy, subnational administrative authority increased. 
Through the first and second wave of decentralisation, national and subnational actors 
became familiarised to decentralisation (a learning mechanism). In spite of divergent 
ideological footholds – from enhancing subnational self-governance to a neoliberal policy 
paradigm of small government – economic and demographic changes from the late 1970s 
– made national and subnational actors agree to the necessity of decentralised 
governance in an era of population ageing and low growth. Recalling the third question 
327 
 
cast in Chapter 1,” what brought the relatively high degree of change in subnational 
autonomy?”, the author argues that the experience of the first wave of decentralisation 
and the changed actors’ idea – from a strong belief in the Developmental State to 
scepticism about centralised governance – was the main force for Japan to achieve a 
relatively high degree of change in subnational autonomy.  
Korea’s First Wave of Decentralisation 
As the third wave of democracy, grassroots public movements in Korea fought for 
democratisation throughout the 1980s. This public discontent about centralised 
authoritarian governance and its consequence of unbalanced national development was 
the main cause to push the first wave of decentralisation in Korea. In spite of the 1987 
constitutional reform including political decentralisation, ruling actors delayed the 
introduction of subnational elections several times (K6). During Korea’s first wave of 
decentralisation, trade liberalisation and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 opened 
policy windows to change intergovernmental fiscal systems.  
As a situational mechanism, domestic and international changes – grassroots 
democratisation movements, discontents about centralised authoritarian regimes and its 
outcomes of regional disparity, trade liberalisation, and the end of the Cold War – made 
political actors consider decentralisation as a possible alternative to reduce public 
discontents (see Figure 10.3). Yet, during the first wave of decentralisation, 
democratisation rather than decentralisation was the main purpose of democratisation 
movements. Therefore, the student-led political force to drive democratisation settled 
somewhat settled after the constitutional reform in 1987 including a direct presidential 
election.   
During the first wave of decentralisation, the Korean national government had less 
motivation to transfer administrative and fiscal responsibility to subnational government 
in order to reduce fiscal burden. Instead, decentralisation was pursued in order to 
establish more democratised governance and balanced national development, as national 
government started to reduce Defence Expenditure as the Cold War was ending and 
disarmament underway. As an action-formation mechanism, ruling actors planned and 
implemented administrative and fiscal decentralisation whilst opposition actors 
continuously requested political decentralisation. National government transferred fiscal 
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resources to subnational government in 1989 and 1990, introduced subnational 
legislative elections in 1991, and transferred administrative authority and responsibility in 
1991-1998. Decentralisation reforms in the first wave of decentralisation reflect interests 
of ruling and opposition actors. Ruling actors transferred administrative and fiscal 
authority and responsibility to lessen public discontents about regional disparity, and to 
control subnational politicians after political decentralisation. The 5.31 Education Reform 
which increased education investment, consequently, brought about fiscal 
decentralisation to subnational education governance. Yet opposition actors pursued 
political decentralisation such as the introduction of subnational elections in order to 
challenge centralised national power.   
 
As a transformation mechanism, Korea moved to more decentralised governance after 
the first wave of decentralisation. Subnational elections for executives and legislative 
were introduced in 1991 and 1995 and substantial fiscal resources transferred to 
subnational governments. As can be seen in Table 6.6, subnational autonomy increased 
by ‘10’ in both compulsory education (from 22 to 32) and long-term care services (from 
329 
 
10 to 20). Considering Falleti’s (2010) argument that tied ruling and opposition interests 
with democratisation movement resulted in the relatively high degree of change in 
subnational autonomy, the results of Korea’s first wave of decentralisation raise two 
questions. First, did fiscal decentralisation reforms during the first wave of 
decentralisation increase fiscal capacity of subnational government? Second, why did 
administrative and organisational capacity not change, but political and fiscal capacity 
increased significantly during the first wave of decentralisation in Korea?  
The answer to the first question is yes and no. During the first wave of decentralisation, 
action-formation mechanisms increased subnational share of revenue and expenditure. 
First, the Tobacco Consumption Tax – one of the major tax bases of subnational 
government – was transferred to subnational government. In the same vein, a large 
portion of the increased subnational share of expenditure came from the newly 
introduced intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems – the Local Transfer Grant and the 
Local Education Transfer Grant – during the first wave of decentralisation. Yet, at the 
same time, the Comprehensive Land Tax increased the subnational share of revenue 
because of the overheated real estate market rather than decentralisation. As a macro-
level mechanism, the economic growth and the heated real estate market increased 
subnational fiscal capacity. Therefore, both fiscal decentralisation reforms and booming 
economy had causal power to increase subnational fiscal autonomy.  
As the answer to the second question, the author presents interest-based ideological 
pathways to divergent development of subnational capacity across domains. Both ruling 
and opposition actors shaped their preferences toward decentralisation based on their 
partisan interests. During the first wave of decentralisation, the ruling actors had to 
prepare non-coercive measures to control subnational government after political 
decentralisation. In addition ruling actors had enough fiscal resources – after the abolition 
of the Defence Taxes – to transfer subnational government. Hence, ruling actors 
introduced new block grants – Local Transfer Grant and Local Education Transfer Grant – 
which increased subnational fiscal capacity.  
On the other hand, opposition actors had material interests to promote political 
decentralisation in order to establish political bases in subnational government which 
may grant them electoral victory in next presidential election. At the same time, as life-
long democratisation politicians, opposition actors had political motivations to strengthen 
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decentralised participatory governance. The alignment between interests and ideas of 
opposition actors was the main driver of political decentralisation which increased 
subnational political capacity.  
As a whole, the first wave of decentralisation was the results of long and tough 
negotiation and bargaining between ruling and opposition actors. More importantly, as 
subnational interests were weak, if not absent, there was no improvement of subnational 
organisational capacity by transferring administrative authority of compulsory education 
and long-term care services. Instead, political decentralisation aimed to establish 
opposition actors, political bases at the subnational government. Thus, the first wave of 
decentralisation resulted in a high degree of change in political and fiscal capacity and in 
no change in administrative and organisational capacity.  
Korea’s Second Wave of Decentralisation 
After democratisation, the Kim DaeJung Administration was established in 1998 as the 
first centre-left administration in 37 years. During the second wave of decentralisation, 
the centre-left administrations – the Kim DaeJung and the Roh MooHyun Administrations 
– promoted decentralisation with the slogans of balanced national development and 
deepening subnational self-governance. Thus, as a situational mechanism, in 1998, 
deepened democratisation brought about political decentralisation which engendered a 
regime change from a right to a centre-left administration who had a pro-decentralisation 
position in Korea.  
As an action-formation mechanism, a regime change from a right to a centre-left 
administration brought about the second wave of decentralisation. The Kim DaeJung 
Administration transferred fiscal resources to subnational government by increasing Local 
Shared Tax in 1999 and Local Education Grant in 2000 which had not been changed since 
1983. Between 2000 and 2002, PCPTCA transferred administrative authorities to 
subnational government. In 2002, national government transferred fiscal responsibilities 
for expanded compulsory education. The Roh MooHyun Administration transferred 
administrative responsibility and fiscal resources to subnational government and political 
authorities to subnational education governance.  
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As a transformation mechanism, Korea moved to more decentralised governance after 
the second wave of decentralisation. As can be seen in Table 6.6, subnational autonomy 
increased by ‘9’ in compulsory education (from 32 to 41) and by ‘7’ in long-term care 
services (from 20 to 27). In cross-sectoral comparison of administrative capacity, Korea 
centralised its long-term care service delivery (from 13 to 7) but decentralised its 
compulsory education delivery (from 79 to 88). In a cross-county comparison of 
administrative capacity, Korea centralised its long-term care service delivery (from 13 to 7) 
but Japan decentralised its long-term care service delivery (from 69 to 82). 
In the welfare state stream, the civil society and parents who gained substantial political 
power after democratisation requested the expansion of the Welfare State. As responses 
to these demands, the Kim DaeJung Administration introduced a universal income 
support programme (NBLP) in 2000 and expanded compulsory education in 2002. During 
the Roh MooHyun Administration, national government expanded in-cash and in-kind 
social programmes, such as Child Care Service, voucher programmes, Basic Pension for 
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the Elderly, Long-Term Care Insurance, which were planned by national government and 
delivered by subnational governments. 
In the same vein, national government shared financial responsibilities for expanded 
social programmes with subnational government. For expanded compulsory education, 
national government increased vertical (Local Education Grant from national government) 
and horizontal (statutory transfers from subnational government) fiscal transfers to 
subnational government in 2001. For the newly introduced social programmes, national 
and subnational government shared fiscal responsibilities according to the rule-like 
practice of national (40% - 90%) and subnational (10% - 60%). Exceptionally, in Korea, the 
newly introduced Long-Term Care Insurance was financed by insurance premiums and 
national government transfers. Thus, as a macro-level mechanism the expansion of the 
Welfare State increased administrative and fiscal responsibilities of subnational 
government in delivering Long-Term Care Services.  
Again, when considering Falleti’s (2010) argument that tied ruling and opposition 
interests with democratisation movement resulted in the relatively high degree of change 
in subnational autonomy, the results of Korea’s second wave of decentralisation raises 
two questions. First, after the introduction of Long-Term Care Insurance, why did Japan’s 
administrative capacity become more decentralised whilst Korea’s administrative capacity 
became more centralised? Second, why did Korea’s second wave of decentralisation 
increase subnational administrative capacity in compulsory education but decrease 
subnational administrative capacity in long-term care? 
The author presents divergent subnational capacity, the divergent ideas about equity and 
efficiency, and divergent situations of democratisation in Korea, and fiscal retrenchment 
in Japan as answers. First, prior to decentralisation, subnational government in Japan had 
administrative capacity – the Boards of Education and Welfare Offices and junior welfare 
officers – to deliver compulsory education and long-term care services. Moreover, local 
government has served as an insurer of Local Health Services under a fragmented health 
care system in Japan.  
In contrast, prior to decentralisation, Korea had strong subnational governance – Local 
Education Offices – for delivering compulsory education but had weak subnational 
governance for delivering long-term care services. Moreover, in 2000, Korea consolidated 
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National Health Insurance into a single scheme in order to enhance equity and risk 
pooling effects. Hence, alongside welfare expansion under the centre-left administrations 
(1998-2008), the lack of personnel resources to deliver expanded social services in 
subnational government were main issues to be addressed. 
Second, during the second wave of decentralisation, divergent political and economic 
contexts of Japan and Korea have causal power to shape ruling actors’ preferences 
toward decentralisation. Under the situation of fiscal recession, the ruling LDP in Japan 
had motivation to transfer administrative and fiscal responsibilities under the flag of 
decentralisation. As the ruling LDP had more power throughout the second wave of 
decentralisation, administrative and fiscal authorities and responsibilities rather than 
political authorities were transferred in Japan. Hence, Japan developed more 
decentralised Long-Term Care Service delivery governance. 
In contrast, under the situation of democratisation, ruling actors in Korea pursued 
decentralisation in order to enhance participation and subnational self-governance.  At 
the same time, there is public consensus in Korea which valued equity rather than 
efficiency in delivering social services as can be seen in the establishment of a single 
National Health Care System in 2000. As political actors thought subnational government 
did not have enough administrative and fiscal authorities to deliver long-term care 
services, more centralised governance, centrally financed and delivered, was established 
for delivering Long-Term Care Services in Korea. In sum, under the given economic 
situation of economic recession and relatively developed subnational administrative 
capacity, Japan introduced a more decentralised Long-Term Care Service System. With 
public consensus valuing equity rather than efficiency and relatively less developed 
subnational administrative capacity, Korea introduced a more centralised Long-Term Care 
Service System.  
Lastly, public consensus about decentralised governance was divergent in Japan and 
Korea. In Japan, general public had rather a lenient consensus about regional diversity of 
social programmes because of the experience of progressive governors and mayors. 
Moreover, as can be seen in the collapse of the Ohira Administration and the success of 
the Koizumi Administration, general public in Japan is more hostile to tax-hikes rather 
than decentralisation and regional disparity. To the contrary, in Korea, general public is 
more sensitive about regional difference in social programmes rather than to tax-hikes 
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because of the experience of unbalanced regional development from centralised 
authoritarian regimes.  
As a whole, the Japanese ruling actors with a neoliberal policy paradigm of efficiency 
were able to develop more decentralised Long-Term Care Service. In Japan, Welfare State 
was established prior to decentralisation, ruling actors were sceptical about centralised 
governance, and public consensus was more lenient about regional diversity of social 
programmes. However, ruling actors with the ideas of participation and subnational self-
governance in Korea were not able to transfer more authorities to subnational 
government when they saw decentralisation increase regional disparity. As most of 
Koreans valued equity of social programmes rather than efficiency, ruling actors in Korea 
were not able to transfer administrative authority and responsibility to subnational 
government. 
Conclusion 
Falleti (2010) argues that dominant actors’ partisan and territorial interests shape their 
preferences about decentralisation, which determine the sequence of decentralisation as 
well as the degree of changes in subnational autonomy. As can be seen, Japan’s first wave 
of decentralisation started with prevailing ruling interests and resulted in a low degree of 
changes in subnational autonomy. In addition, Japan’s second wave of decentralisation 
started with tied ruling and opposition interests and resulted in a high degree of changes 
in subnational autonomy. Hence, at a glance, Falleti’s sequential theory of 
decentralisation seems to fully explain the first and the second wave of decentralisation 
in Japan.  
However, extensive process-tracing results in this section demonstrate that ideas with 
prevailing interests have causal power to explain the degree of changes in subnational 
autonomy. For instance, Falleti’s theory cannot explain why subnational authority in 
social care services increased but subnational authority in compulsory education was 
static after Japan’s first wave of decentralisation. Moreover, during the second wave of 
decentralisation, non-LDP Prime Ministers pursued decentralisation in order to enhance 
subnational self-governance and promoted fiscal decentralisation whilst LDP Prime 
Ministers regarded decentralisation as a tool to establish small government transferred 
administrative authority and fiscal resources. Thus, dominant actors’ ideological stances 
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combining political interests and contexts have causal power to determine types of 
decentralisation and the degree of changes in subnational autonomy.  
In the same vein, during Korea’s first and second waves of decentralisation, tied ruling 
and opposition interests resulted in a high degree of changes in subnational autonomy. 
During the first wave of decentralisation, grassroots democratisation movements 
increased subnational political autonomy, which resulted in a high degree of changes in 
subnational autonomy. In contrast, during the second wave of decentralisation, the idea 
of enhancing subnational self-governance (which was owned by ruling actors) increased 
subnational administrative and fiscal autonomy, which resulted in a high degree of 
changes in subnational autonomy.  
Thus, the cases of Korea’s decentralisation demonstrate that there might be multiple 
causal pathways from tied ruling and opposition interests to a high degree of changes in 
subnational autonomy. Possibly, ideological causal factors had more explanatory weight 
to the degree of changes in subnational autonomy after decentralisation. For instance, 
during Korea’ second wave of decentralisation, public preferences about equity and 
balanced national development prohibited ruling actors with a pro-decentralisation 
position to develop decentralised long-term care service delivery governance. Thus, 
dominant actors’ ideological stances with their partisan and territorial interests have 
causal power to determine the types of decentralisation and the degree of changes in 
subnational autonomy. In the next section, detailed ideological causal pathways are 
traced in the first and second wave of decentralisation in Japan and Korea.  
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IDEOLOGICAL PATHWAYS TO DECENTRALISED GOVERNANCE 
Based on four case studies (Chapter 7, 8 and 9), this section presents ideological 
pathways to decentralised governance. Combined with political and economic 
circumstances, ideological footholds of decentralisation demonstrate causal pathways to 
types of decentralisation and degree of changes in subnational autonomy (Table 10.1).  
Cross-country Comparison: The First Wave of Decentralisation 
In the case of Japan’s first wave of decentralisation, because of situational factors, such as 
population ageing, low growth, and increasing government debts, dominant ruling actors 
were sceptical about centralised fiscal governance. Fiscal reconstruction was the 
ideological foothold of Japan’s first wave of decentralisation. Hence, administrative and 
fiscal responsibilities were transferred to subnational government, which resulted in the 
low degree of change in subnational autonomy. At the same time, the Japanese national 
government attempted to introduce or raise the Consumption Tax, as an indirect tax 
which levies on the consumption of every goods and services, in order to overcome its 
fiscal difficulties. As the introduction and rise of indirect taxes had extensive impacts from 
small businesses to general public, indirect tax-hikes always faced a strong backlash from 
voters and resulted in the introduction of the Subnational Consumption Tax in 1997. 
Alongside with interests, ideas owned by political actors and general public had causal 
power to shape fiscal decentralisation in Japan.  
Prior to the first wave of decentralisation, long-standing authoritarian regimes in Korea 
raised public scepticism on centralised governance with lack of democratic legitimacy and 
its adverse consequences of unbalanced national development. As the idea of 
democratisation bridged opposition politicians and grassroots public movements, political 
authorities were transferred to subnational government which resulted in a high degree 
of changes in subnational autonomy. In addition, during the first wave of decentralisation, 
the Korean national government did not need to take political risks to raise taxes because 
the end of the Cold War meant it had financial resources to transfer to subnational 
governments. Even when the Korean national government had to raise taxes, it raised the 
Tobacco related Taxes, which is a levy on smokers, instead of the Value Added Tax, which 
is levied on general public. Thus, the Korean national government had less opposition 
from the public and was able to sustain the centralised tax system. 
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In conclusion, during the first wave of decentralisation in Japan and Korea, the ideological 
causal pathways existed, alongside with interests and contexts, to shape the types of 
decentralisation. The idea of fiscal reconstruction brought about transfers of 
(administrative and fiscal) responsibilities whilst the idea of democratisation brought the 
transfer of political authority. Types of decentralisation determine the degree of changes 
in subnational autonomy: decentralisation of (administrative and fiscal) responsibilities 
brings about a low degree of change in subnational autonomy; however, decentralisation 
of (political) authority increases subnational autonomy significantly.  
Cross-country Comparison: The Second Wave of Decentralisation 
In the case of Japan’s second wave of decentralisation, non-LDP prime ministers (1993-
1996) promoted decentralisation, based on the idea of enhancing subnational self-
governance. Yet, LDP prime ministers (1997-2006) promoted decentralisation in order to 
streamline a bloated central government. During the second wave of decentralisation, 
Japan did not expand compulsory education but introduced a universal Long-Term Care 
Insurance System. Regardless of standstills and expansion of services, after the second 
wave of decentralisation, subnational autonomy increased significantly in both 
compulsory education and long-term care services. Administrative and fiscal authorities 
were transferred to subnational government. In 1980s Japan, the economic, political, and 
demographic changes, economic recession, the end of Cold War, and population ageing, 
created favourable environment for both ruling and opposition actors to drive 
decentralisation as a new national agenda. 
In contrast, after Korea’s second wave of decentralisation, subnational autonomy for 
compulsory education increased significantly whilst subnational autonomy for long-term 
care services increased at a medium level. During Korea’s second wave of decentralisation, 
subnational administrative capacity for compulsory education was increased by ‘8’ (from 
17 to 25). Yet, subnational administrative capacity for long-term care services decreased 
by ‘12’ (from 25 to 13). 
In compulsory education, the ideological footholds of democratisation and participation 
brought about the transfer of political autonomy. Moreover, the idea of enhancing 
subnational self-governance made ruling actors transfer (administrative and fiscal) 
authority as well as responsibility to subnational government. Alongside a policy 
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paradigm to enhance subnational self-governance, the institutional capacity of 
subnational education governance, consisting of Superintendents and Boards of 
Education, provides a favourable environment to implement political decentralisation of 
direct election of subnational education governance in the 2000s.  
In contrast, in long-term care services, the ideological footholds of equity and balanced 
national development blocked the ruling actors from establishing a decentralised long-
term care insurance system in Korea. The introduction of universal Long-Term Care 
Insurance resulted in recentralisation of (administrative and fiscal) authority and 
responsibility in Korea. As the health care system consolidated into a single scheme with 
centralised management and private delivery in 2000, the newly introduced long-term 
care services also designed as a similar system. In addition, the Korean subnational 
government had less experience to run health care or long-term care financing and 
delivery system. As a whole, the institutional legacy of centralised health care governance 
and the lack of subnational capacity to run long-term care services had causal power to 
reduce subnational administrative capacity in long-term care services.  In conclusion, the 
cross-country comparison of the second wave of decentralisation reinforces the 
argument of ideological pathways toward decentralised governance. During the second 
wave of decentralisation, Japan and Korea had several common aspects: tied interests, 
the establishment of centre-left administrations with the idea of enhancing subnational 
self-governance, the standstill of compulsory education, and the expansion of long-term 
care services. In spite of these commonalities, subnational autonomy in Japan increased 
for both compulsory education and long-term care services whilst subnational autonomy 
in Korea increased only for compulsory education.  
In Japan, the idea of fiscal retrenchment brought about transfers of (administrative and 
fiscal) authority and responsibility which increase subnational autonomy. Moreover, 
national actors in Japan were able to transfer (administrative and fiscal) responsibility to 
subnational government without worrying about quality deterioration of public services. 
In Korea, the ideas of equity and balanced national development prevented ruling actors 
in Korea from transferring authority and responsibility to subnational government when 
long-term care services were expanded.  
Succinctly, decentralisation reforms in Japan and Korea brought about different outcomes 
as the ideological footholds of main actors who drove decentralisation were different. As 
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the political actors in Japan regarded decentralisation as a solution to overcome 
imminent fiscal and demographic crises, administrative and fiscal authorities were 
transferred to subnational government throughout the Trinity Reform in 2003-2006. 
However, the political actors in Korea understood decentralisation as a means to cure 
centralised authoritarian government. As the ideas of balanced national development and 
equity prevailed in Korea, political actors were mainly interested in political 
decentralisation. Although administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms were 
discussed, political actors could not transfer substantial administrative and fiscal 
authorities to subnational government which resulted in aggravating unbalanced tax 
revenues.  
As institutional factors, extant tax systems and industrial structures facilitated or 
constrained the options for decentralisation reforms. When national actors in Japan faced 
fiscal crises, tax-hikes cannot be taken as a solution to overcome snowballing government 
debts because factors such as the direct tax-centred tax system and the small and 
medium business-centred industrial structure. Hence, politicians favoured administrative 
and fiscal decentralisation reforms as a means to lessen national government debts. In 
contrast, Korea has a big conglomerate centred industrial structure and an indirect tax 
centred system. The Korean national actors had both policy options of raising indirect 
taxes (Tobacco Related Taxes) and decentralisation. Thus, Japan transferred 
(administrative and fiscal) authority and responsibility to subnational government whilst 
Korea increased taxes instead of transferring little (administrative and fiscal) authority 
and responsibility to subnational government.   
Cross-Periodic Comparison: Japan 
This section compares the first (1982-1991) and the second (1997-2007) wave of 
decentralisation in Japan.  Subnational autonomy in compulsory education increased 
from ‘48’ to ‘49’ during the first wave of decentralisation, and from ‘49’ to ‘58’ during the 
second wave of decentralisation. In particular, subnational administrative capacity did not 
change during the first wave of decentralisation but increased, from ‘79’ to ‘88’ during 
the second wave of decentralisation. This shows that the ideological tensions between 
communism and capitalism deterred national actors from transferring administrative 
capacity in compulsory education to subnational government during the first wave of 
decentralisation. . However, after the Cold War ended and Nykkoso moved slightly from 
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its strict left-wing position in the late 1980s, national actors in Japan became more lenient 
to transfer administrative authority to subnational government. Thus, during the second 
wave of decentralisation, the Japanese national actors were able to transfer 
administrative authority about compulsory education with less concern about ideological 
issues.  
On the other hand, subnational autonomy in long-term care service increased from ‘44’ 
to ‘47’ during the first wave of decentralisation, and from ‘47’ to ‘56’ during the second 
wave of decentralisation. In particular, during both periods, administrative capacity of 
subnational government increased from ‘63’ to ‘69’ and from ‘69’ to ‘82’. Whilst teachers 
who deliver compulsory education had strong unions and left-wing stances, long-term 
care service workers did not have a left-wing ideological propensity and were not 
institutionalised or unionised. As there was no ideological conflict amongst actors 
involved in long-term care services, national actors were able to transfer administrative 
authority and capacity to subnational government from the first wave of decentralisation. 
In addition, during the second wave of decentralisation, subnational revenues and 
expenditure decreased from ‘47’ to ‘44’ and from ‘67’ to ‘62’, respectively. Instead, 
subnational fiscal discretion increased sharply from ‘29’ to ‘58’. National ruling actors in 
Japan started to doubt the sustainability of centralised governance in the era of 
population ageing and low growth. Hence, during the second wave of decentralisation, 
national government transferred administrative responsibility more than fiscal resources 
to subnational government. Instead, national government gave more autonomy in taxing 
and borrowing to subnational government.  In conclusion, the cross-periodic analyses of 
Japan demonstrate that ideas have the causal power to constrain political actors’ choices. 
For compulsory education policy of Japan, during the first wave of decentralisation, the 
ideological conflicts of the Cold War prohibited national actors from transferring 
administrative authority to subnational government. After the end of the Cold War, 
during the second wave of decentralisation, national actors more freely transferred 
administrative authority to subnational government. For long-term care service policy of 
Japan, during the first wave of decentralisation, national actors perceived the limitations 
of centralised social service delivery governance, and transferred administrative and fiscal 
authority to subnational government because there was no severe ideological conflict. 
Cross-sector Comparison: Korea’s Second Wave of Decentralisation 
341 
 
As discussed, during Korea’s second wave of decentralisation, subnational autonomy for 
compulsory education increased significantly from ‘32’ to ‘41'; however, subnational 
autonomy for long-term care services increased moderately from ‘20’ to ‘27’. Particularly, 
subnational administrative capacity for compulsory education increased by ‘8’ (from 17 to 
25) whist subnational administrative capacity for long-term care services decreased by ‘12’ 
(from 25 to 13). Alongside the causal power of ideas, such as a policy paradigm of 
enhancing subnational self-governance, historical and institutional legacies also have 
causal power to determine actors’ preferences about decentralisation.    
Japan has developed subnational government in both compulsory education and long-
term care services after the Second World War. Yet, since the 1950s Korea has developed 
centralised governance, except subnational education governance under the US Military 
government. Moreover, Japan developed a decentralised National Health Insurance 
System whilst Korea consolidated its fragmented Health Insurance Systems into a single 
scheme of National Insurance Service in 2001.  
Therefore, during the second wave of decentralisation, national actors transferred 
authority and responsibility of compulsory education to subnational education 
governance because subnational education government had robust subnational 
governance to plan and deliver transferred responsibilities. Yet, national actors 
transferred delivery responsibility for long-term care services to the National Health 
Insurance Cooperation rather than subnational government. The centralised Health 
Insurance System, developed under the slogan of equity in health, had more robust 
governmentality to delivery long-term care services.  In conclusion, subnational 
governmental capacity as well as the ideological footholds of decentralisation has causal 
power to determine the degree of changes in subnational capacity. 
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 Table 10.1 Ideological pathways to types of decentralisation and degree of changes in subnational autonomy 
 Situational factors Dominant 
interests 
Dominant 
actors’ 
scepticism 
Ideological foothold Subnational 
capacity 
Types of 
decentralisation 
Degree of 
changes 
Japan’s first 
wave 
 Population ageing 
 Low growth 
 Increasing 
government debts 
 Hostile public 
consensus toward 
indirect tax-hikes 
National 
(Ruling) 
Centralised fiscal 
responsibility 
 Fiscal reconstruction HIGH Transferred 
(administrative + 
fiscal) responsibility 
LOW 
Korea’s first 
wave 
 Democratisation 
movements 
Tied  
(Ruling + 
opposition) 
Undemocratic 
centralised 
governance 
 Democratisation LOW Transferred (political) 
authority 
HIGH 
Japan’s second 
wave 
 Establishment of 
non-LDP 
administrations 
 Increasing 
government debts 
Tied 
(National + 
Subnational) 
National 
government’s 
administrative 
and fiscal control 
 Enhancing 
subnational self-
governance  
 Neoliberalism 
HIGH Transferred  
(administrative + 
fiscal) authority and 
(fiscal) responsibility 
HIGH 
Korea’s second 
wave: 
compulsory 
education 
 Asian Financial 
Crisis 
 Establishment of 
centre-left 
administrations: 
participation 
 Less hostile public 
consensus toward 
tax-hikes 
Tied  
(Ruling + 
opposition) 
Unbalanced 
national 
development, 
undemocratic 
governance 
 Enhancing 
subnational self-
governance    
 Democratisation 
HIGH Transferred  (political 
+ administrative + 
fiscal) authority and 
fiscal responsibility 
HIGH 
Korea’s second 
wave: long-
term care 
Tied  
(Ruling + 
opposition) 
Unbalanced 
national 
development 
 Enhancing 
subnational self-
governance  
 Equity 
LOW Recentralised 
(administrative + 
fiscal) authority and 
responsibility 
Medium 
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Summary 
As contribution of this thesis, this section investigates the ideological causal pathways to 
decentralised governance in Japan and Korea. First, the cross-country comparison study 
of the first wave of decentralisation demonstrates that dominant actors’ ideological 
footholds have causal power to shape the types of decentralisation and to determine the 
degree of changes in subnational autonomy. As the idea of fiscal reconstruction 
promoted Japan’s first wave of decentralisation, national actors in Japan transferred 
administrative and fiscal responsibility which consequently resulted in a low degree of 
changes in subnational autonomy. In contrast, during Korea’s first wave of 
decentralisation, political authority was transferred to subnational government as the 
ideological footholds enhanced subnational self-governance promoted by grassroots 
democratisation movement which consequently increased subnational autonomy as it 
was promoted by grassroots democratisation movements.  
Second, the cross-country comparison of the second wave of decentralisation also 
demonstrates that dominant actors’ ideological footholds have causal power to shape the 
types of decentralisation and to determine the degree of changes in subnational 
autonomy. Although Japan and Korea had tied ruling and opposition interests before the 
second wave of decentralisation, Japan and Korea had divergent outcomes in subnational 
autonomy. In Japan, political actors regarded decentralisation as a means to accomplish 
the policy paradigm of efficiency when they discussed the Trinity Reform in the 2000s. 
Therefore, ruling actors in Japan transferred (administrative and fiscal) authority and 
responsibility to subnational government which resulted in the increase of subnational 
autonomy. 
In Korea, after the second wave of decentralisation, subnational autonomy in compulsory 
education increased more than that in long-term care services. The policy paradigm of 
participatory governance was the ideological background to promote the second wave of 
decentralisation in Korea. Direct elections for Superintendents and Councillors were 
introduced in the late 2000s. At the same time, national actors’ transferred administrative 
and fiscal responsibility to expand compulsory education in 2002. Consequently, after the 
second wave of decentralisation, subnational autonomy in compulsory education 
increased significantly.  
344 
 
In contrast, there was public consensus that valued equity rather than efficiency in long-
term care delivery. When long-term care insurance system was introduced, ruling actors 
decided to recentralise long-term care delivery responsibility from subnational 
government to national government and National Health Insurance Cooperation. Hence, 
administrative capacity of subnational government decreased after the second wave of 
decentralisation. In sum, the ideas of dominant political actors and the general public had 
stronger causal power than partisan and territorial interests. 
Third, the cross-periodic comparison study of Japan’s decentralisation also demonstrates 
that dominant actors’ ideas constrained institutional changes toward decentralisation. 
During the first wave of decentralisation, Japan did not transfer administrative authority 
of compulsory education to subnational government because of ideological conflicts 
between national government and the Teacher’s Union. As ideological conflicts were 
relieved after the end of the Cold War, national actors in Japan transferred administrative 
authority to subnational government. In contrast, Japan transferred administrative 
authority and responsibility of long-term care services to subnational government as 
there were no ideological conflicts between national actors and care workers. .  
Lastly, the cross-sector comparison study of Korea’s second wave of decentralisation 
demonstrates that institutional readiness of subnational governments had causal power 
to determine the degree of changes in subnational autonomy. After Korea’s second wave 
of decentralisation, subnational administrative authority for compulsory education policy 
increased whilst subnational administrative authority for long-term care services 
decreased. Apart from the valued idea of equity, as subnational governments did not 
have enough capacity to deliver long-term care services, national actors in Korea were 
unable to transfer (administrative and fiscal) authority and responsibility of long-term 
care services to subnational governments.  
 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis contributes to the extant knowledge methodologically, theoretically, and 
empirically. First, this thesis contributes to the extant knowledge by suggesting that 
Falleti’s (2010) interest-based theory and intensive approaches have limitations when 
explaining institutional changes toward decentralised governance in Japan and Korea. 
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Instead, this thesis presents ideological causal pathways to explain institutional changes 
toward decentralised governance by using extensive approaches.  
As can be seen in Korea’s first wave of decentralisation, the idea of democratisation had 
causal power to implement political decentralisation which increases subnational political 
authority. In contrast, during Japan’s first wave of decentralisation, the idea of fiscal 
reconstruction had causal power to implement administrative decentralisation which 
increased subnational fiscal responsibility. During Japan’s second wave of decentralisation, 
the policy paradigm pursuing small government with scepticism about centralised 
governance had causal power to implement administrative and fiscal decentralisation 
which increased subnational (administrative and fiscal) authority and responsibility. 
During Korea’s second wave of decentralisation, the idea of participatory democracy had 
causal power to increase subnational political authority. Yet, the idea of equity had causal 
power to recentralised administrative and fiscal authority which decreased subnational 
administrative authority.  
More importantly, compared to the intensive process-tracing methods of Falleti (2010), 
the extensive process-tracing methods which were used by the author show analytical 
advantages to elucidate causal pathways from structural factors to the degree of changes 
in subnational autonomy. Structural factors exert their causal power directly and 
indirectly. For instance, during Japan’s first wave of decentralisation, a structural factor of 
the booming real estate market had direct causal power to increase subnational fiscal 
authority. In contrast, the structural factor of economic recession had the causal power to 
make the ruling actors sceptical about centralised governance; and this causal power 
(scepticism) endeavoured national government to transfer administrative and fiscal 
responsibility to subnational governments. Finally, this administrative decentralisation 
increased subnational administrative autonomy. Thus, the booming real estate market in 
the 1990s had direct causal power to increase subnational fiscal authority whilst the 
economic recession of the 1980s had indirect causal power to keep the degree of 
subnational autonomy.  
In the same vein, during Korea’s first wave of decentralisation, structural factors had the 
direct and indirect causal power to the types and degree of changes in subnational 
autonomy. A structural factor of the booming real estate market had direct causal power 
to increase subnational fiscal authority. Grassroots democratisation movements had 
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causal power to spread scepticism about the centralised authoritarian regime, which 
resulted in the introduction of popular elections of subnational politicians. Then, political 
decentralisation increased subnational political autonomy. Finally, as the end of the Cold 
War resulted in the abolition of the Defence Taxes, the Korean national government had 
more fiscal resources to transfer to subnational governments. Thus, during Korea’s first 
wave of decentralisation, structural factors had the direct and indirect causal power to 
increase subnational political and fiscal autonomy. 
Second, after completing four case studies in Japan and Korea, the author argues that the 
ideological motivations to promote decentralisation shape the types of decentralisation, 
which determine the degree of changes in subnational autonomy. For instance, during 
Japan’s second wave of decentralisation, the regime change from the LDP to the coalition 
government in 1993-1996 had the causal power to spread the idea of decentralisation in 
order to enhance subnational self-governance. This idea resulted in the abolition of the 
agency-delegated system and increased subnational administrative autonomy. In contrast, 
the regime change from the coalition government to the LDP administration after 1996 
spread a neoliberal policy paradigm of pursuing small government to transfer 
administrative and fiscal authority to subnational governments. Thus, as structural factors, 
regime changes and following ideological change of ruling actors had indirect causal 
power to the types and degree of changes in subnational autonomy.  
During Korea’s second wave of decentralisation, the regime change from a right to a 
centre-left administration in 1998 had the causal power to spread the ideas of 
decentralisation and balanced national development. The centre-left administrations 
(1998-2008) who promoted decentralisation could not transfer taxing authorities to 
subnational governments because they valued equity and balanced national development. 
Moreover, with decentralisation, the centre-left administrations in Korea expanded the 
Welfare State, which resulted in centralised administrative authority and decentralised 
administrative and fiscal responsibility. Thus, the ideas of pro-equity and pro-welfare 
prohibited the centre-left administrations in Korea from transferring further 
administrative and fiscal authority to subnational governments, which resulted in little 
changes in subnational autonomy.  
Lastly, the thesis tested the generalisability of Falleti’s theory in the East Asian context of 
Japan and Korea. Although Falleti’s theory has intrinsic limitations such as issues in 
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measurement and omission of the role of idea, it provides a useful framework to 
investigate issues surrounding actors, their preferences, and decentralisation reforms. In 
addition, her theory, developed based on the empirical study in Latin America, partially 
explains decentralisation reforms in Japan and Korea over recent decades. In addition, the 
thesis expanded the scope of time from the first wave of decentralisation to the second 
wave of decentralisation.  In Japan, Falleti’s theory partially explains the first and second 
wave of decentralisation. Subnational autonomy increased more during the second wave 
of decentralisation, which started with fiscal decentralisation, rather than the first wave 
of decentralisation which started with unfunded administrative decentralisation.  
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Although this thesis theoretically, methodologically, and empirically contributes to the 
extant knowledge, it also has some limitations. First, as the proposed ideological 
approach was developed from four case studies in Japan and Korea, the generalisability of 
the proposed ideological causal pathways should be tested in countries which have 
different economic and political contexts. For instance, South Asian countries with less 
matured party politics and election systems may show different causal pathways to 
decentralised governance. In addition, the institutional peculiarity of the South Asian 
countries – such as the strong intervention of international organisations – should also be 
considered. Moreover, the ideological approach should be tested in countries with 
federal governance as both Japan and Korea have a unitary system.  
Second, there might be technological limitations in measuring subnational autonomy. 
Although the proposed measurement tool was developed based on extensive literature 
review, it is possible that variables used to measure subnational autonomy may either 
overestimate or underestimate subnational autonomy.  
Third, the definition of post-developmentalism needs to be revisited from the perspective 
of the Welfare State. Falleti (2010) defined the starting point of post-developmental 
decentralisation by the changes of economic policy. However, as can be seen in Korea’s 
second wave of decentralisation, a country can promote post-developmental or 
neoliberal decentralisation and the expansion of the Welfare State at the same time. Thus, 
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it might be worth to attempt a periodisation from the welfare retrenchment rather than 
from the emergence of post-developmental economic policy.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES 
Cross-Subnational Government Comparison 
This thesis attempted to compare cases across countries, sectors, and periods in order to 
elucidate causal pathways from structural, institutional, and individual factors to diverse 
degrees of decentralised governance. Time and words limits of the thesis prevent the 
author from conducting a comparative study across subnational governments in one 
country. Considering that the thesis demonstrates subnational administrative capacity is 
one of the important causal factors to explain the divergent degree of changes in 
subnational autonomy, comparative studies between intermediate and local 
governments may provide a better understanding about the causal pathways to 
decentralised governance. 
Subnational Autonomy and the Quality of Public Services 
This thesis aims to elucidate causal pathways to the diverse degrees of changes in 
subnational autonomy. However, it did not investigate the relation between 
(de)centralised governance and the quality of public services. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
regardless its purposes, decentralisation had extensive repercussions on the public 
service delivery. It is necessary to understand how (de)centralised governance had impact 
on public service delivery in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and equity.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 List of the Selected 40 Papers 
NO Year Author Title country 
1 2000 Brodjonegoro and 
Asanuma 
Regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation in democratic Indonesia Indonesia 
2 2000 Hill and Fujita State restructuring and local power in Japan Japan 
3 2001 Heller Moving the State: the politics of Democratic decentralisation in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre South Africa, India, 
Brazil 
4 2001 Legaspi The changing role of local government under a decentralised state Philippines 
5 2001 Silver intergovernmental transfers and decentralisation in Indonesia Indonesia 
6 2001 Tandon Globalisation and decentralisation: emerging issues from the Indian experience India 
7 2002 Bossert and Beauvais Decentralisation of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision 
space 
Ghana, Zambia, 
Uganda, Philippines 
8 2002 Gaiha and Kulkarni Panchayats, communities, and the rural poor in India India (regions) 
9 2003 Jacobs Devolving Authority and expanding Autonomy in Japanese prefectures and municipalities Japan 
10 2003 Skinner et al. social and environmental regulation in rural China: bringing the changing role of local government into focus China 
11 2004 Hunter Local issues and changes: the post-new order situation in rural Lombok Indonesia (regions) 
12 2004 Tsui and Wang Between separate stoves and a single menu: Fiscal decentralisation in China China 
13 2005 Dyer Decentralisation to improve teacher quality? District institutes of education and training in India India (regions) 
14 2005 Lewis Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: an explanation of pre- and post-decentralisation fiscal 
outcomes 
Indonesia 
15 2005 Scheiner Pipelines of pork: Japanese politics and a model of local opposition party failure Japan 
16 
 
2006 Kang Globalisation of the economy and localisation of politics?: Restructuring of Korean Developmental State via 
decentralisation 
Korea 
17 2006 Kristiansen and 
Santoso 
Surviving decentralisation? Impacts of regional autonomy on health service provision in Indonesia Indonesia (regions) 
18 2007 Sheng Global market integration and central political control: Foreign trade and intergovernmental relations in China China 
19 2008 Firman In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta metropolitan area (JMA) under Indonesia's new Indonesia (regions) 
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NO Year Author Title country 
decentralisation policy: old problems, new challenges 
20 2009 Ghai and Woodman Unused powers: contestation over autonomy legislation in the PRC China 
21 2009 Jimenez Anatomy of autonomy: Assessing the organisational capacity and external environment of the autonomous 
region in Muslim Mindanao 
Philippines (regions) 
22 2009 Venugopal and Yilmaz Decentralisation in Kerala: panchayat government discretion and accountability India (regions) 
23 2010 Chang Reforms and decentralisation in Korea and Russia: issues and research agendas in the center-periphery relations Korea, Russia 
24 2010 Chien Economic freedom and political control in post-Mao China: a perspective of upward accountability and 
asymmetric decentralisation 
China 
25 2010 Haque Decentralising local governance in Thailand: contemporary trends and challenges Thailand 
26 2010 Lam Central-provincial relations amid greater centralisation in China China 
27 2010 Li Central-local relations in the people's republic of China: Trends, processes and impacts for policy 
implementation 
China 
28 2010 Yep Understanding the autonomy of Hong Kong from historical and comparative perspectives China (regions) 
29 2011 Langran Decentralisation, democratisation and health: the Philippine Experiment Philippines 
30 2011 Panday Local government system in Bangladesh: how far is it decentralised? Bangladesh 
31 2012 Imai and Sato Decentralisation, democracy and allocation of poverty alleviation programmes in Rural India India (regions) 
32 2012 Tsai, Hsu, and Chen The effects of population aging, the ruling political party, and local governments on welfare spending in Taiwan: 
1993-2007 
Taiwan 
33 2012 Wang et al. Fiscal reform and public education spending: a quasi-natural experiment of fiscal decentralisation in China China (regions) 
34 2013 Brixi et al. Engaging subnational governments in addressing health equities: challenges and opportunities in China's health 
system reform 
China 
35 2013 Kim Political decentralisation, subnational political capital, and intergovernmental transfers in Korea Korea 
36 2013 Kuo and So Pursuing revenue autonomy or playing politics? Fiscal behaviour of local governments in Taiwan Taiwan 
37 2013 Niu Fiscal decentralisation in China revisited China 
38 2013 Song Rising Chinese regional income inequality: the role of fiscal decentralisation China 
39 2013 Sudhipongpracha The Specter of Leviathan in the central-local relations: a comparative historical analysis of the Decentralisation 
reform in Thailand and Philippines 
Thailand, Philippines 
40 2013 Yu Devolution: Discontinuity and dissonance Philippines 
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Appendix 2 Historical and Institutional Development of Japan and Korea 
 Japan Korea 
Constitution Unitary Unitary 
President /prime minister Prime Minister President 
Legislative power Bicameral (divided into two houses) Unicameral 
 
Executive and Legislative 
relation 
- Legislative dominant Parliamentary system - Executive dominant presidential system 
Party system 
One party dominant period  1955 - 1993 1963 - 1998 
The reason of one-party 
dominance  
- Electoral victory - The authoritarian regime (1961-1979) 
- Transition to democracy but under new military regime (1980-
1988) 
- Electoral victory (1988-1998) 
Legalisation of party activities Legalised from 1947 constitution - Legalised from 1948 constitution 
- Party activities were forbidden under the Martial Law (1972-1979) 
Elections system 
Presidential election - 
(Parliamentary government) 
- Indirect popular election (1948-1952, 1960-1962, 1972-1986) 
- Direct popular election (1952-1960, 1963-1971, 1987-present) 
General election - National Diet (The House of representative 
and house of councillors, direct election) 
(1948-present) 
- Election methods changed from SNTV-
MMD to Single member constituency in 
1996 
- National Assembly members, direct election (1948-1971) 
- National Assembly members, direct and indirect election (1972-
1981) 
- National Assembly members, direct election (1981 – present) 
- Election methods; single member constituency (1948 -1962), SNTV-
MMD (1963-1981), Single member constituency (1981-present) 
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 Japan Korea 
Representativeness of National 
Assembly members 
- Mixed system (majority and proportional 
representative) 
- The House of Representative: Single-seat 
constituency (300); proportional 
representation (180) 
- The House of Councillors: Plural-seat 
prefectural constituency (146); 
proportional representation (96) 
- Mixed system (majority and proportional representative) 
- Single-seat constituency (246); proportional representation (54) 
Local elections - Full local election for heads and councils 
(1947-present) 
- Local council member election in 1952 
- Head of local government election 1960 
- All local elections were suspended until the unification (1961-1980) 
- All local elections were suspended until local fiscal condition 
becomes sound (1980-1991) 
- Local council member election (1991-present) 
- Head of local government election (1995-present) 
Party influence on local election - Centralised (party nomination system) - Centralised (party nomination system) 
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Appendix 3 Elite Interview Topic Guide 
     
1. The aim of this project 
 Compare the processes and outcomes of social policy decentralisation, 
especially compulsory education and social benefits and social care in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. 
 In particular, I am interested in actors and their ideas, interests, and 
preferences before and after decentralisation reforms implemented.  
 Therefore, I would like to explain whether any causal mechanisms between 
actors’ ideas, interests and preferences and local autonomy after 
decentralisation exist? In addition, whether any causal mechanisms between 
institutional arrangement and local autonomy after decentralisation exist? 
 Also, I would like to evaluate what determines the outcomes of 
decentralisation in terms of local autonomy. 
 (If there is an unfamiliar issue, it is fine not to answer about that issue.) 
 
2. (Issue 1) Describe a broad picture of social welfare service provision in Japan 
 What sorts of cash benefits and social care service?  
 Who (central, intermediate, local governments, NPO, Private sector) plan, 
finance, implement, provide social welfare service?  
 
3. (Issue 2) Decentralisation reforms from the 1990s 
 Major reforms from the 1990s 
 What drove decentralisation reforms? (political leadership? new ideas? 
political interests?) 
 Who were main actors in the process of decentralisation?  
- What kind of preferences toward decentralisation did they have? (pro-
decentralisation, anti-decentralisation, reluctantly following reforms?)  
- What were each actor’s ideas or interests which were behind their 
preferences?  
e.g., ideas (new public management, progressive, conservative, equity, efficiency); 
interests (partisan interests, territorial interests, electoral interests) 
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- The power of subnational associations, the rate of national assembly 
members who used be a governor or mayor 
e.g., the number, sorts, and influence of subnational associations, the 
impact of subnational associations in the process of political decision 
making 
 
 Facilitators and constraints of further decentralisation  
- The role of political institutions (party politics, intergovernmental 
relations, election system, executive and legislative relations) in the 
process of decentralisation) 
- The role of societal contexts (developmental state’s legacy?) 
 
 Was there repercussion or impact from general decentralisation reforms to 
social welfare service provision in Japan? 
 
4. (Issue 3) Outcomes of decentralisation 
 General outcomes of decentralisation reforms in Japan 
(In the long run, has local autonomy in social welfare provision increased as 
expected?) 
 Were there major changes in the role of central, intermediate, and local 
governments in social service provision since the 1990s in Japan? 
 After decentralisation, local government’s power has been increased in 
planning, financing, implementing and providing of social benefits and social 
care services in Japan? 
 Could you explain the change of intergovernmental relations before and after 
the major reforms? 
For example, 1) division of functions such as personnel and organisation 
(administrative power) 2) division of fiscal power 3) division of political power 
between central, intermediate (to, do, fu, ken) and local government (shi, cho, son) 
 Is there discrepancy in the degree of local autonomy in social welfare provision 
between formally stipulated laws and decrees and de facto practice? 
 What factors contribute for successful reforms? 
 What factors were limited the successful implementation of the reforms? 
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5. (Issue 4) Subnational government’s organisational power 
 The number, sorts, and influence of national and subnational associations 
 The impact of national and subnational associations in the process of political 
decision making? 
 The number, sorts and influence of associations related to social welfare 
(benefits and services)?  
 How much influence do they have in decision making in national and local 
level decision making in social welfare service provision? 
 
6.  Recommendation for data sources and documents 
 A list of local government’ functions; delegated functions, mandatory 
autonomous functions, etc. 
 Fiscal statistics of local government’s fiscal power; revenue power, 
expenditure power, discretionary expenditure power 
 Related laws and decrees 
 
7. Snowballing recruitment of potential participants 
 Key informants who involved in the planning and implementing of 
decentralisation reforms (National and subnational levels, NGO and NPO) 
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Appendix 4 Consent Form of the Elite Interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and Purpose  
My name is Eunkyung Shin. I am a PhD student at the University of York in the 
Department of Social Policy and Social Work. I would like to invite you to take part in my 
research study, which explores processes of social policy decentralisation in East Asian 
countries. 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time 
and location of your choice.  The interview will involve questions to collect general 
information about the processes of decentralisation in your country and related issues.  
The semi structured interview should last about one hour.  
With your permission, I will audiotape the interview and take notes during the interview.  
The recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used for 
transcription purposes only.  If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead.  
If you agree to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, 
I can turn off the recorder at your request.  Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop 
the interview at any time.  
I expect to conduct only one interview; however, follow-ups may be needed for added 
clarification.  If so, I will contact you by email/phone to request this within a 12-month 
period following this interview. The follow-up interview will involve some further 
clarifications and possibly additional questions. 
Participant Information Sheet 
The process of institutional change toward decentralisation             
of the East Asian Social policy:  
PhD research project 
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Benefits 
Whilst there is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study, it is hoped that the 
research will enhance overall understanding processes of decentralization in East Asia.  
Risks 
There are few likely risks because your information is confidential and will be anonymised. 
The information regarding your personal identification and (direct and indirect) 
quotations will not be used without your explicit permission. The interview data will only 
be used for academic purposes, including the researcher’s own doctoral thesis and 
related publications. 
Confidentiality 
Your study data will be confidential. To minimize the risks to confidentiality, no personal 
identification details will be recorded. The audio records and the electronic interview 
scripts will be stored in the University of York Server with password. The paper interview 
scripts will be stored in a locked drawer in the Research Centre for Social Science in 
University of York. Data will be assessed only by the researcher.  
When the research is completed, I may save the audio records and electronic transcripts 
for use in future research done by myself or others.  I will destroy these records in 
December 2020 after the study is over. The same measures described above will be taken 
to protect the confidentiality of this study data.  
Anonymity 
If results of this study are published (i.e. a Doctoral Thesis, journal publication and book 
publication) or presented (i.e. conference presentation and personal web presentation), 
individual names and other personally identifiable information will not be used without at 
explicit permission being sought and obtained.  
Rights 
Participation in the research is voluntary. You are free to decline to take part in the 
project.  You can decline to answer any questions and are free to stop taking part in the 
project at any time. A summary of the research will be provided to you via email after 
completion of this study. 
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Questions 
If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. I can be 
reached at +82 10 9959 2355 or es933@york.ac.uk. My supervisor, Dr. Neil Lunt, also can 
be reached at +44 1904 321235 or neil.lunt@york.ac.uk.  
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CONSENT 
 
You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep for your own records. 
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ 
Participant's Name (please print) 
 
_____________________________ _______________ 
Participant's Signature   Date 
 
 
[Optional] 
If you agree to allow me to audiotape this interview, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date 
 
 
[Optional] 
If you agree to allow your name to be included in all final reports, publications, and/or 
presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date 
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[Optional] 
If you agree to allow your job title to be included in all final reports, publications, and/or 
presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date 
 
 
[Optional] 
If you agree to allow direct quotations of your interview data to be included in all final reports, 
publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date 
 
[Optional] 
If you agree to allow indirect quotations of your interview data to be included in all final reports, 
publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date
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Appendix 5 Primary Data: Elite Interviews in Japan  
No Name Gender Title Organisation Method Contents Date Round 
J1 JA1 
(Anonymous) 
Male Professor Wished to remain 
anonymous 
Face to face in English Social Policy in Japan 13/11/2014 
(Osaka) 
1st 
J2 KUDO, Hiroko Female Professor Chuo University Face to face in English Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
14/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J3 YOKOMICHI, Kiyotaka Male Vice President 
and Professor 
National Graduate 
Institute for Policy 
Studies(GRIPS) 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
19/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J4 JA2 
(Anonymous) 
Male Professor Wished to remain 
anonymous 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Social Policy in Japan 19/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J5 NAKANO, Koichi Male Professor Sophia University Face to face in English Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
20/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J6 MUTA, Hiromitsu Male Retired 
Professor 
Tokyo Metropolitan 
University 
Face to face in English Compulsory 
Education policy in 
Japan 
20/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J7 HAYASHI, Masayoshi Male Professor University of Tokyo Face to face in English Fiscal 
decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
21/11/2014 
(Tokyo) 
1st 
J8 TAKAMI, Shigeru Male Professor Kyoto University Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Compulsory 
Education policy in 
Japan 
With EGAMI 
25/11/2014 
(Kyoto) 
1st 
J9 EGAMI, Naoki Male Assistant 
Professor 
Kyoto University Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Compulsory 
Education policy in 
25/11/2014 
(Kyoto) 
1st 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Method Contents Date Round 
Korean interpreter Japan 
(With professor 
TAKAMI) 
J10 
 
YOON, SeongKook Male Teaching 
fellow 
Doshisha University Face to face in Korean Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
25/11/2014 
(Kyoto) 
1st 
J11 ONO, Taichi Male Director 
 
Former 
director of 
MHLW 
Department of Planning 
and Coordination, 
National Institute of 
Population and Social 
Security Research 
Face to face in English Development of 
long-term care 
system in Japan 
9/4/2014 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J12 JA3 
(Anonymous) 
Female Deputy 
Director 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
Paper interview in 
English questions and 
Japanese answers 
Local tax system in 
Japan 
10/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J13 AHIGUCHI, Satoshi Male Executive 
Director 
Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology 
Paper interview in 
Japanese questions 
and Japanese answers 
Compulsory 
education system in 
Japan and its 
development 
21/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J14 JA4 
(Anonymous) 
Male Wished to 
remain 
anonymous  
Wished to remain 
anonymous 
Paper interview in 
Japanese questions 
and Japanese answers 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
21/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J15 KANBAYASHI, Yoji Male researcher The Japan Research 
Institute for Local 
Government 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan, 
With TSUJIYAMA 
and MITSUDA 
24/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Method Contents Date Round 
J16 MITSUDA, Yoshito Male Director 
general 
The Japan Research 
Institute for Local 
Government 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
With TSUJIYAMA 
and KANBAYASHI 
24/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J17 TSUJIYAMA, Takanobu Male General 
secretary 
The Japan Research 
Institute for Local 
Government 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
With MITSUDA and 
KANBAYASHI 
24/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J18 YAMAMOTO, Akihiko Male Deputy 
Director 
Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Long-term care 
service 
24/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J19 HONDA, Masato Male Senior 
Researcher 
National Institute for 
Educational Policy 
Research 
Face to face in 
Japanese with a 
Korean interpreter 
Compulsory 
education system in 
Japan and its 
development 
27/4/2015 
(Tokyo) 
2nd 
J20 ICHIKAWA, Yoshitaka Male Professor Department of Political 
Science, Faculty of Law, 
Doshisha University 
Paper interview in 
English questions and 
Japanese answers 
Decentralisation 
reforms in Japan 
6/5/2015 
(Kyoto) 
2nd 
J21 Hirahoka, Koichi Male Professor Ochanomizu University Face to face in English Long-term care 
service in Japan 
31/7/2015 
(Singapore) 
2nd 
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Appendix 6 Primary Data: Elite Interviews in Korea: Face-to-Face Interview in Korean 
No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
K1 Kim, 
ByungJoon  
Male Professor Chairperson of the Presidential Committee on 
Innovation and decentralisation in 2003-2004 
Kookmin University 
Decentralisation 
general 
7/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K2 HJH 
(Initial) 
Male Professor Member of working committee of the Presidential 
Committee on Innovation and decentralisation in 
2003-2006 
Choongang University 
Decentralisation 
general 
10/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K3 Lee, Jaewon  Male Professor He developed “Community Investment Service” 
programmes in MoHW as an exchange civil servant 
(from Bukyung University) in 2006-2007. 
He collaborated with director in MoHW in order to 
develop the concept of social investment states in 
South Korea from 2005. 
Social service 13/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K4 Chung, 
Jeayoung  
Male Professor Former civil servant in the Ministry of Education of 
Korea 
Education 16/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K5 Park,  
Seungjoo  
Male Former central civil 
servant 
Secretary of the Presidential Committee on 
Innovation and decentralisation in 2003-2006 
Former civil servant in MOGAHA and vice minister of 
the Ministry of Gender equality 
Decentralisation 
general 
21/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K6 LSJ 
(Initial) 
Male Professor 
Former civil servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Decentralisation 
general 
23/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K7 Um, 
Moonyoung  
Male Researcher Korea Education Development Institution Education 25/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K8 KHJ 
(Initial) 
Male Researcher Wished to remain anonymous Education 29/10/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
K9 Yoon, Sungsik  Male Professor Korea University, Chairman of the Presidential 
Committee on Innovation and decentralisation in 
2004-2006 
Decentralisation 
general 
3/11/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K10 Song,  Kichang  Male Professor Sookmyung Women’s University Education 5/11/2014 
(Seoul) 
1st 
K11 KA1 
(Anonymous) 
Male Researcher  Local government association Decentralisation 
general 
27/2/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K12 KA2 
(Anonymous) 
Male Director Ministry of Health and Welfare Social service 27/2/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K13 K 
(Initial) 
Male Professor Wished to remain anonymous Decentralisation 
general 
3/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K14 KA3 
(Anonymous) 
Male Researcher  Intermediate government association Decentralisation 
general 
4/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K15 KA4 
(anonymous) 
Male Researcher  
Local civil servant 
Local government association 
With J. Lee 
Decentralisation 
general 
4/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K16 J. Lee 
(Initial) 
Male Researcher Secretary Local government association 
With KA4 
Decentralisation 
general 
4/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K17 Son, Heejun Male Professor Cheongju University 
former member of the presidential committee of 
innovation and decentralisation in 2003-2005 
Decentralisation 
general, 
Social service 
6/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K18 Kwon, 
Duckcheol 
Male Central government 
civil servant 
 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Director of social welfare policy in 2004 
General director of welfare policy in 2009 
Social service 9/3/2015 
(Sejong) 
2nd 
K19 Lee, JooSeok Male Wished to remain 
anonymous 
Wished to remain anonymous Decentralisation, 10/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
K20 Nho, Gil-sang Male Former central 
government civil 
servant  
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
PhD. University of Bristol  
Social service 11/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K21 Lee, Minkyu Male Professor Chungbuk University Decentralisation 
general, Korea 
and Japan 
12/3/2015 
(Sejong) 
2nd 
K22 Kang, Hyekyu Female Researcher  Korea Institute of Health Affairs and Social Affairs 
Researcher in Presidential Committee on Social 
Inclusion in 2006 
Social service 12/3/2015 
(Sejong) 
2nd 
K23 Lee, Kiwu Male Professor  
 
Inha University 
The presidential committee of innovation and 
decentralisation in 2003-2006 
Decentralisation 
general, 
education 
13/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K24 KYS 
(Initial) 
Male Deputy director  
Central government 
civil servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Decentralisation, 
fiscal 
decentralisation 
17/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K25 Hwang, 
Joonseung 
Male Researcher  
 
Wished to remain anonymous Education 17/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K26 CHY 
(Initial) 
Female Local civil servant 
Social worker 
Wished to remain anonymous with Youngsuk Kim Social service 17/3/2015 2nd 
K27 Kim, Youngsuk Male Community welfare 
specialist 
Community welfare specialist, Local government, 
social worker 
With CHY 
Social service 17/3/2015 
(Seongnam) 
2nd 
K28 Son, Gunik Male Professor 
Former vice minister  
Kookmin University 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Social service 18/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
367 
 
No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
K29 KA5 
(Anonymous) 
Male Former higher civil 
servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Decentralisation 
general 
18/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K30 KA6 
(Anonymous) 
Female Local civil servant 
Social worker 
Wished to remain anonymous Social service 19/3/2015 2nd 
K31 Kim, Anje Male Retired Professor 
 
Chairman of Presidential Commission for Promotion 
of Local Empowerment in 1998-2002 
Seoul National University 
Decentralisation 
general 
19/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K32 Moon , 
Byeong-Joon  
Male Provincial government 
civil servant 
Intermediate government (Gyeonggi Province) Social service 20/3/2015 
(Suwon) 
2nd 
K33 Oh, Jaeil Male Professor Chunnam University 
Presidential Committee on Local Autonomy 
Development from 2013 
Member of Reorganization committee of Local 
Administration in 2011-2013 
Member of decentralization advancement 
committee in 2008-2010 
Member of Presidential committee on Innovation 
and decentralisation in 2004-2006 
Member of Presidential commission for Promotion 
of Local empowerment in 1999-2003 
Decentralisation 
general 
20/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K34 Jeon, Byungku Male Provincial government 
civil servant,  
Social worker  
Wished to remain anonymous Social service 23/3/2015 2nd 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
K35 Moon, 
YoungTack 
Male Provincial government 
civil servant,  
Director of Education  
Intermediate 
government 
Jeju special self-governing province, Education Office 
Former teacher and principal 
Education 23/3/2015 
(Jeju) 
2nd 
K36 KA7 
(Anonymous) 
Female Local government civil 
servant  
Wished to remain anonymous Social service 25/3/2015 2nd 
K37 KA8 
(Anonymous) 
Female Local government civil 
servant 
Social worker  
Wished to remain anonymous Social Service 25/3/2015 2nd 
K38 Lee, Youngkyo Male Professor Kwangju University Social service 
Local politics 
25/3/2015 
(Kwangju) 
2nd 
K39 Lee, Young 
Hwan  
Male Metropolitan city civil 
servant 
Director of primary 
education division  
 
Seoul Metropolitan office of education  
Former director of the Korean Teachers & 
Educational Workers' Union (KTU) 
Education 26/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K40 Um, Kiyooung Male Local government civil 
servant, 
Social worker 
Local government (county) Social service 26/3/2015 
(Yeoju) 
2nd 
K42 Kim, Soosam Male Manager of 
community welfare  
Korea National Council on social welfare Social service 27/3/2015 
(Seoul) 
2nd 
K43 Koh, Sungho Male Local government civil Local government (county), social worker Social service 27/3/2015 2nd 
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No Name Gender Title Organisation Contents Date Round 
servant, 
Manager of welfare 
planning team 
Social worker 
(Gapyung) 
K44 KA9 
(Anonymous) 
Female Local government civil 
servant 
Social worker 
Wished to remain anonymous Social service 29/3/2015 2nd 
K45 Kwon, KiSeub Male Provincial government 
civil servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Social service 31/3/2015 
 
2nd 
K46 KA10 
(Anonymous) 
Male Provincial government 
civil servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Education 31/3/2015 2nd 
K47 KA11 
(Anonymous) 
Male  Intermediate civil 
servant 
Wished to remain anonymous Education 31/3/2015 2nd 
K48 KA12 
(Anonymous) 
Female Local government civil 
servant  
Wished to remain anonymous  Social service 1/4/2015 
 
2nd 
K49 Ryu, Eunjoo 
 
Female Local government civil 
servant, 
Director  
Local government (City) Social service 1/4/2015 
(Kumi) 
2nd 
K50 Cho, GeumRae Male Local civil servant  Local government (County) Social service 1/4/2015 
(Chilgok) 
2nd 
K51 KA13 
(Anonymous) 
Male Professor   Wished to remain anonymous 
 
Decentralisation 
general 
3/8/2015 
 
2nd 
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Appendix 7 Secondary Data List: Japan 
Minutes 1. Minute of the Japanese Diet (Upper and Lower) (1992-2015) 
(http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/) 
2. Minute of the Decentralisation Promotion Committee (1995-
2001) 
(http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8418775/www8.cao.go.jp
/bunken/bunken-iinkai/index-bu.html) 
3. Minute of the Council for Decentralisation Reform (2001-2007) 
(http://www.cao.go.jp/bunken-suishin/archive/archive-
index.html, 
http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8313852/www8.cao.go.jp/
bunken/) 
4. Summary of the Local Finance Committee (2002-2015) 
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/singi/chizai/kaigi.html) 
White 
papers 
1. White Paper on Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (2001-2012) 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/hakusho.htm) 
2. Japanese Government Policies in Education, Science, Sports and 
Culture (1989-2000) 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/hakusho.htm) 
3. Japan’s Modern Educational System 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/
1317220.htm) 
4. Annual Health, Labour and Welfare Report (1998-2014) 
(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/) 
5. White Paper on Local Public Finance 
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_seisaku/hakusyo/index.html) 
Policy 
reports 
1. Decentralisation Promotion Committee’s Recommendation and 
Reports (http://www.cao.go.jp/bunken-
suishin/archive/archive-index.html) 
2. Structural Reform of Local Public Finance and Transfer of Tax 
Revenue Sources (Katayama draft Policy) (2002) 
(http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-
shimon/cabinet/2003/decision0626.html) 
Research 
Papers 
1. Up-to-date Documents on Local Autonomy in Japan Series in 
CLAIR (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, 
http://www.clair.or.jp/e/pub/others/index.html) 
2. National Governor’s Association Reports 
(http://www.nga.gr.jp/data/activity/committee_pt/committee/
bunken/2000/index.html) 
Statistics 1. Election Statistics (Election Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications) 
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(http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_seisaku/senkyo/index.html) 
2. Japanese Statistical Year Book (Statistics bureau, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications) 
(http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/index.htm) 
3. OECD Government Taxation Statistics 
(https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV) 
Official 
websites 
1. Cabinet office, Government of Japan 
(http://www.cao.go.jp/index.html) 
2. Local autonomy established Council for Decentralization 
Reform Promotion Headquarters 
(http://www.bunken.nga.gr.jp/) 
3. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/index.html) 
4. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
of Japan (http://www.mext.go.jp/) 
5. Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare of Japan 
(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/) 
6. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
(http://www.ipss.go.jp/) 
Law and 
Decrees 
1. Decentralisation Promotion Law (1995) 
2. Promotion of Decentralisation Reform Law (2006) 
3. Local Financial Reconstruction Law (2007) 
4. Local Tax Law 
5. Local Autonomy Law 
6. Long-term Care Service Law 
7. Local education administration Law 
Published 
book and 
paper 
Related Journal Papers 
Monography 
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Appendix 8 Secondary Data List: Korea 
Minutes 1. Minute of the National Assembly of Korea (1987-2015) 
(http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.jsp) 
White 
papers 
1. Local Education Year Book (1985-2014) 
2. White Paper of Health and Welfare 
Policy 
reports 
1. Participatory Government (2003-2008) Policy Report: Education 
decentralisation policy 
2. Participatory Government (2003-2008) Policy Report: Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
3. Enactment process of the Special Law on Decentralisation (2003-
2004)  
Statistics 1. Local Financial Year Book (1991-2014) 
2. Local Education Finance (http://www.eduinfo.go.kr/main.do) 
3. Election Statistics 
Official 
websites 
1. National Archives of Korea 
(http://www.archives.go.kr/next/viewMain.do) 
2. Government Innovation and decentralisation Committee (2003-2008) 
(http://innovation.pa.go.kr/committee/region_work.htm) 
3. Ministry of Health and Welfare (http://www.mw.go.kr) 
4. Ministry of Education (http://www.moe.go.kr) 
5. Ministry of Interior (http://www.moi.go.kr/frt/a01/frtMain.do) 
6. Korean Research Institute of Local Administration (http://krila.re.kr/) 
7. Korea Education Development Institution (www.kedi.re.kr) 
8. National Assembly Library (dinanet.go.kr) 
9. Ministry of Strategy and Finance (www.mosf.go.kr) 
10. Open Fiscal Data (www.openfiscaldata.go.kr) 
Law and 
Decrees 
1. Local Autonomy Law 
2. Local Education Law 
3. Local Finance Law 
4. Local Tax Law 
5. Local Allocation Tax Law 
6. Local Education Allocation Tax Law 
7. Long-term Care Insurance Law 
8. Special Law on Decentralisation 
Published 
book and 
paper 
Related Journal Papers 
Monography 
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Appendix 9 Literature on Measuring Subnational Autonomy 
 Federal 
/Unitary 
Intermediate 
/Local 
Subnational 
elections 
Discretions (legal, administrative, 
fiscal) 
Capacity Veto Dataset 
Hooghe, 
Marks, and 
Schakel (2008); 
Regional 
Authority Index 
(RAI) 
- (intermediate 
only) 
 (intermediate 
only) 
o  
(revenue raising, revenue-sharing, 
law making) 
(the range of policies for regional 
governments responsible / the 
extent regional government co-
determine national policy / 
autonomous rather than 
deconcentrate) 
- Veto (of S)  
Constitutional 
amendment 
1950-2010 
81 countries 
Arzhaghi and 
Henderson 
(2005) 
√  (intermediate/ 
local) 
(intermediate/ 
local) 
o (revenue raising, revenue-
sharing) 
- Veto (of N) 
For subnational 
governments’ 
decisions 
1960-1995 
16 European and 
OECD countries 
Brancati (2006) - -  (subnational) o (taxing, education, police) - Veto (of S)  
Constitutional 
amendment 
1985-2000 
40 European, 
Balkan and OECD 
countries 
Hooghe and 
Marks (2001) 
√  (intermediate 
only) 
 (intermediate) o (taxing, education, police, 
cultural, transport and 
communication, economic, 
political institutions) 
- Veto (of S) 
legislative and 
executive power 
sharing 
1950, 1970, 1990, 
2000 
14 Western 
European 
countries 
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 Federal 
/Unitary 
Intermediate 
/Local 
Subnational 
elections 
Discretions (legal, administrative, 
fiscal) 
Capacity Veto Dataset 
Lane and 
Ersson (1999) 
√ √ - √ - Veto (of S) 
 
The post-WWII 
18 Western 
European 
countries 
Lijphart (1999; 
2012) 
√ - - - - - 1945-2010, 1985-
2010 
36 countries (24 
west European 
and OECD 
countries) 
Treisman 
(2002) 
- √ √ √ - - The mid-1990s 
41 European, 
Balkan and OECD 
countries 
Woldendrop et 
al. (2000) 
√ - - √ - - The post-WWII 
37 European, 
Balkan and OECD 
countries 
Castles (1999) √ - - √ (fiscal centralisation, fiscal 
decentralisation, fiscal difficulty) 
- √ (veto points 
constitutional 
features) 
1973, 1983, 1992 
21 OECD 
countries 
Blochliger and 
Rabesona 
(2009) 
- - - √ (a taxonomy of tax autonomy 
based on right to introduce or to 
abolish a tax, to set tax rates, to 
define the tax bases, or to grant 
tax allowance or reliefs to 
individuals and firms) 
- - 1995-2005 
33 OECD 
countries 
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 Federal 
/Unitary 
Intermediate 
/Local 
Subnational 
elections 
Discretions (legal, administrative, 
fiscal) 
Capacity Veto Dataset 
Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) 
- - - √ (subnational spending ratio net 
of grants, subnational tax 
autonomy, subnational tax 
sharing, subnational fiscal 
dependency, subnational non-tax 
autonomy) 
- - 1970-89 
46 developed and 
developing 
countries 
Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002) 
- - - √ (tax autonomy, non-tax 
autonomy, subnational tax 
sharing) 
- - OECD GFS  
Enikolopov 
and 
Zhuravskaya 
(2007) 
- - - √ (subnational revenue share, 
fractionalisation of government 
parties) 
- - 1975-2000 
75 developing 
and transitional 
countries 
Kim et al. 
(2013) 
- - - √ (a taxonomy of tax autonomy 
based on right to introduce or to 
abolish a tax, to set tax rates, to 
define the tax bases, or to grant 
tax allowance or reliefs to 
individuals and firms) 
- - 2005 
33 OECD 
countries 
Meloche et al. 
(2004) 
- - - √ (subnational revenue 
autonomy, subnational own 
revenue ratio, subnational 
dependent revenue ratio) 
- - 1999 
10 European 
Transitional 
counties 
Schneider 
(2003) 
- - - √ - - 68 countries  
Shair-
Rosenfield, 
- √ (intermediate 
only) 
√ (intermediate 
only) 
√ (the institutional depth of a 
regional government, its policy 
- Veto (of S)  
Constitutional 
1950-2010 
5 Southeast Asian 
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 Federal 
/Unitary 
Intermediate 
/Local 
Subnational 
elections 
Discretions (legal, administrative, 
fiscal) 
Capacity Veto Dataset 
Marks, 
and Hooghe 
(2014) 
scope, its fiscal autonomy, its 
borrowing autonomy, the extent 
to which it has autonomous) 
(the extent to which a regional 
government codetermines 
national legislation, executive 
policymaking, tax allocation, 
borrowing constraints, 
constitutional reform) 
amendment countries  
(Malaysia, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, South 
Korea, Thailand) 
Stegarescu 
(2007) 
- - - √ (taxing authority – rate, base, 
Sharing authority – 
codetermination or not) 
- - 1970-1975,  
1996-2001 
23 OECD 
countries 
Wolman et al. 
(2008) 
- √ (only local) - √ (taxing, spending, debt limits/ 
Structural and functional 
responsibility/  
legal scope) 
 
√ (of S) 
 
fiscal 
resources/
personnel/  
- 2002 
49 states in USA 
(Source: Figure devised by author)  
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Appendix 10 Regional Authority Index (RAI) and its Measurement (Hooghe et al., 2008) 
Self-rule Shared rule 
Institutional depth 
0: no functioning general-purpose administration at the regional level 
1: a deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 
2: a non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to 
central government veto 
3: a non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administrative not subject 
to central government veto 
Law making 
0.5 is scored for each of the following characteristics. Aggregate scores range 
between 0 and 2; 
 The region is the unit of representation in the legislature; 
 The regional government designates representatives in the legislature 
 The regional government or the regional representatives in the 
legislature negotiate on national legislation affecting the region 
 The regional government or the regional representatives in the 
legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the 
region 
Policy scope 
0: the regional government does not have authoritative competence 
over economic policy, cultural-education policy, or cultural-education 
policy, or welfare state policy 
1: the regional government has authoritative competence in one of 
the following areas: economic policy, cultural-education policy, 
welfare state policy 
2: the regional government has authoritative competencies in at least 
two of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational 
policy, welfare state policy 
3: the regional government meets the criteria for 2 and is endowed 
with at least two of the following:  
 Residual powers 
 Regional police force 
 Authority over own institutional set-up 
 Authority over local governments 
4: the regional government meets the criteria for 3, and has authority 
over immigration or citizenship 
Executive control 
0: no routine meetings between central government and regional 
governments to negotiate policy 
1: routine meetings between central government and regional 
governments without legally binding authority 
2: routine meetings between central government and regional 
governments with authority to reach legally binding decisions 
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Self-rule Shared rule 
Fiscal Autonomy 
0: the central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes 
1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 
2: the regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes 
3: the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: 
personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax 
4: the regional government sets the base and rate of at least one 
major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sale tax 
Borrowing autonomy 
The extent to which a regional government can borrow: 
0: the regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed 
rules prohibit borrowing) 
1: the regional government may borrow under prior authorization (ex 
ante) by the central government and with one or more of the 
following centrally imposed restrictions: 
a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) 
b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank 
c. no borrowing above a ceiling 
d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes 
2: the regional government may borrow without prior authorization 
(ex post) and under one or more of a), b), c), d), e) 
3: the regional government may borrow without centrally imposed 
restrictions. 
Fiscal control 
0: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are 
not consulted over the distribution of tax revenues 
1: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature 
negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto 
2: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature 
have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues 
 
Representation 
 
Assembly 
0: the region has no regional assembly 
1: the region has an indirectly elected regional assembly 
2: the region has a directly elected assembly 
 
Constitutional reform 
0: the central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally 
change the constitution 
1: a legislature based on the principle of regional representation must 
approve constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a 
referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation 
(i.e. approval in a majority of regions); 
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Self-rule Shared rule 
Executive 
0: the regional executive is appointed by central government  
1: dual executives appointed by central government and the regional 
assembly 
2: the regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or is 
directly elected 
2: regional governments are a directly represented majority in a 
legislature which can do one or more of the following 
 Postpone constitutional reform 
 Introduce amendments 
 Raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber 
 Require a second vote in the other chamber 
 Require a popular referendum 
3: a majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change 
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Appendix 11 Revised Measurement of Subnational Autonomy 
Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
Political 
Capacity 
1. Types of 
Appointment of 
Subnational 
representatives 
(Definition) to what extent subnational executives and legislatives 
independently represent their jurisdictions 
 Executives: governors, mayor, and superintendent of education (or 
educational governor) 
 Legislatives: Intermediate councils, local councils, Boards of Education 
(Operationalisation)  
 A, appointed (=0) 
 A/C, appointed by mayors or governors with upper government’s consent 
(=0.25) 
 A/-C, appointed by mayors or governors without upper government’s 
consent (=0. 5) 
 R/E, restricted competitive election (=0.75) 
 E, elected (=1) 
Arzhaghi and Henderson 
(2005) 
Brancati (2006) 
Falleti (2005) 
Hooghe et al. (2008) 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
Schneider (2003) 
Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2014) 
Treisman (2002) 
Wolman et al. (2008) 
2. Law Making 
Authority  
(Definition) the degree of authority owned by subnational government in 
national legislations and constitutional reforms  
 National legislations 
 Constitution reforms 
(Operationalisation)  
 N, national government monopoly (=0) 
 C, national and subnational government shared (=0.5) 
 S, subnational government monopoly (=1) 
Hooghe et al. (2008) 
Brancati (2006) 
Castles (1999) 
Lane and Ersson (1999) 
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Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
3. Administrative 
Control (AC) 
(Definition) the degree of national involvement in subnational autonomous and 
commissioned affairs  
(Operationalisation) 
 Sorts of 
subnational 
affairs 
All subnational 
affairs are 
autonomous 
(=1) 
Both autonomous 
and 
commissioned 
(=0.5) 
Autonomous, 
commissioned, 
and agency-
delegation (=0) 
 Types of national 
involvement 
 No involvement (=1) 
 Legally-not-binding involvement (i.e. advice, 
recommendation, and reporting), (=0.5) 
 Legally-not-binding and Legally-binding 
involvement (i.e., permission, approval, direction, 
and consultation) (=0) 
 Scope of national 
involvement 
 legitimacy (=1) 
 appropriateness (=0) 
 Role of national 
government in ex 
post involvement 
 Inform to the third party (i.e., an independent 
judicial or auditing body) judgement (=1) 
 Involve directly to subnational affairs without the 
third party’s judgement (=0)   
 Types of ex post 
direct 
involvement 
 Exerting amending or implementation orders to 
subnational government (=1) 
 Exerting amending or implementation orders to 
subnational government and letting intermediate 
government exert amending or implementation 
orders to local government (=0.5) 
 Exerting amending or implementation orders to 
author 
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Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
subnational government, and cancellations or 
execution on behalf of subnational government 
(=0) 
 
Administrative 
Capacity 
4. Policy Making 
Authority (PMA) 
(Definition) to what extent subnational government has the decision-making 
authority and delivery responsibility in a specific policy area 
 (General Administration) Personnel management, Organisational 
management, Financial management (budgeting and settlement), self-
governing management 
 (Education) Curricular, Teachers’ training, Evaluation, School 
management, Personnel management, Salary 
 (Long-Term Care Services) Levels and sorts of benefits, Criteria of eligible 
users, Fiscal management, and Delivery management 
(Operationalisation) 
 N, national government monopoly (=0) 
 C, national and subnational government shared (=0.5) 
 S, subnational government monopoly (=1) 
Falleti (2005) 
Hooghe et al. (2008) 
Lane and Ersson (1999) 
Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2014) 
Wolman et al. (2008) 
5. Bureaucratic 
Governmentality 
(BG) 
(Definition) whether subnational government had bureaucratic apparatus to 
plan, implement, and deliver when decentralisation take place, whether 
decentralisation contributes to develop subnational bureaucratic apparatus  
 Bureaucratic apparatus  
 (Operationalisation) 
 P, present (=1), A, absent (=0) 
author 
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Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
Fiscal 
Capacity 
6. Subnational 
Share of 
Revenue (SSR) 
(Definition) fiscal resources are collected by subnational government 
(Operationalisation)  
 SSR =
Tax,   non−tax revenues,   and borrowing of subnational government
National and subnational revenues−duplication
 * 100 
 SSR may take from 0 to 100. 
Arzhaghi and Henderson 
(2005) 
Brancati (2006) 
Blochliger and Rabesona 
(2009) 
Castles (1999) 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) 
Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 
(2007) 
Falleti (2005) 
Hooghe et al. (2008) 
Kim et al. (2013) 
Meloche et al. (2004) 
Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2014) 
Stegarescu (2007) 
Treisman (2002) 
Woldendrop et al. (2000) 
Wolman et al. (2008) 
7. Subnational 
Share of 
Expenditure 
(SSE) 
(Definition) fiscal resources are allocated by subnational government 
(Operationalisation) 
 SSE =
Subnational Expenditure
National and subnational expenditure−duplication
 *100 
 SSE may take from 0 to 100. 
8. Subnational 
Discretion on 
Fiscal Rule (DFR) 
(Definition) subnational government’s discretion on taxing and borrowings 
(Operationalisation) - Hooghe et al. (2008) 
 Tax rates and bases 
- 0: the national government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes  
- 1: the subnational government sets rate of minor taxes 
- 2: the subnational government sets the base and rate of minor taxes 
- 3: the subnational government sets the rate of at least one major tax: 
personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax, 
- 4: the subnational government sets the base and rate of at least one 
major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sale tax 
 Subnational borrowings 
- 0: the subnational government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed 
rules prohibit borrowing) 
- 1: the subnational government may borrow under prior authorization (ex 
384 
 
Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
ante) by the central government and with one or more of the following 
centrally imposed restrictions: a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover 
current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the 
central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to 
specific purposes 
- 2: the subnational government may borrow without prior authorization 
(ex post) and under one or more of a), b), c), d), e)  
- 3: the subnational government may borrow without centrally imposed 
restrictions 
Organisational 
capacity 
9. Subnational 
Government 
Associations 
(SGA) 
(Definition)  
 The number of subnational associations 
 The number of legalised subnational associations 
 The legal right to present opinions to national government 
 (Operationalisation) 
 The maximum possible number of nationwide subnational associations is 
determined by horizontal and vertical tiers of subnational government 
and whether each tier has elected executive and legislative bodies. 
 The maximum possible number of legalised subnational associations is 
the same to the number of nationwide subnational associations. 
 The legal right: P, present (=1), A, absent (=0) 
Falleti (2005) 
Stone-Weiss (1997) 
 
10. Territorial 
Representation 
of Interest in the 
(Definition) the discrepancy between the shares of legislative seats and the 
shares of population held by subnational governments 
Falleti (2005) 
Samuels and Snyder (2001) 
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Domain variables Definition and Operationalisation Source 
National 
Legislatures (TRI) 
(Operationalisation) 
 The Malapportionment Index by Samuels and Snyder (2001) 
 TRI may take 0 to 100. 
Stepan (2000) 
11. Audit and 
Evaluation of 
National 
Government 
(NGAE) 
 (Definition) the existence of national government’s comprehensive evaluation 
and audit system about subnational governments’ performance 
 National comprehensive evaluation about subnational governments’ 
performance  
 National audit about subnational governments’ performances 
(Operationalisation) 
 P, present (=0), R, restricted audit or evaluation (=0.5), A, absent (=1) 
author 
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Appendix 12 TRI (Territorial Representation of Interests) Measurement 
 
Based on Samuels and Snyder (2001)  
 
1. In single-tier system 
 
The absolute value of the difference between each district’s seat and population shares, adds them, and then divides by two. 
 
MAL = (1/2) Ʃ l si - vi l 
 
 
2. In multi-tier system: single district constituencies and a nationwide proportional list system 
 
(1) Calculate the percentage of seats awarded to each district without including any upper-tier seats in the total number of seats 
(2) Multiply the percentage of the country’s total population residing in each district by the number of upper-tier seats 
(3) Add the number of upper-tier seats allocated to each district to the number of lower-tier seats allocated to each district 
(4) Calculate the new percentage district using the total number of seats in the national assembly 
(5) Calculate malapportionment using the new percentage of seats for each district 
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Appendix 13 Changes of Subnational Autonomy in Japan: A Revised Measurement 
Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1980 1994 2007 1980 1994 2007 
Political 
Capacity 
1. Types of Appointment of 
Subnational Representatives 
5.5 5.5 6 69 69 75 
 Governors E E E    
 Mayors E E E    
 Educational Superintendents 
in intermediate 
A/C A/C A/-C    
 Educational Superintendents 
in local 
A/C A/C A/-C    
 Intermediate council E E E    
 Local council E E E    
 Boards of Education in 
intermediate 
A/-C A/-C A/-C    
 Boards of Education in local A/-C A/-C A/-C    
2. Law Making Authority  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 National legislations N N N    
 Constitution reforms N N N    
3. Administrative Control  2 2 0.5 40 40 10 
 Sorts of subnational affairs 0 0 0.5    
 Types of national involvement 0 0 0    
 Scope of national involvement 0 0 0    
 Role of national government in 
ex post involvement 
1 1 0    
 Types of ex post direct 
involvement 
1 1 0    
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Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1980 1994 2007 1980 1994 2007 
Administrative 
Capacity 
4. Policy Making authority         
1) Education 3.5 3.5 4.5 58 58 75 
 Curricular C C C    
 Teacher’s training S S S    
 Evaluation C C C     
 School management C C C    
 Hiring, firing, placement S S S    
 Salary N N N    
2) Long-term care services 1 1.5 2.5 25 38 63 
 Levels and sorts of benefits N N C    
 Criteria of eligible users N N N    
 Financial management C S S    
 Delivery management C C S    
5. Bureaucratic Governmentality        
 Education P P P 100 100 100 
 Long-term care P P P 100 100 100 
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Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1980 1994 2007 1980 1994 2007 
 
Fiscal Capacity 
6. Subnational Share of Revenue  39% 46.6% 43.6% 39 47 44 
7. Subnational Share of 
Expenditure 
64.5% 
67.1% 
(1995) 
61.7% 
65 67 62 
8. Discretion on Fiscal Rule  2 2 4 29 29 58 
 Tax rate and base 1 1 2 25 25 50 
 Subnational borrowing 1 1 2 33 33 66 
Organisational 
Capacity 
9. Subnational Government 
Associations  
   
41 41 74 
 Number of subnational 
associations 
9 9 10 
56 56 63 
 The number of legalised 
subnational associations 
6 6 6 
66 66 60 
 The legal right to present 
opinions to national 
government 
A A P 
0 0 100 
10. Territorial representation of 
interest (TRI) 
   
   
 The Upper House 10.3 (1980) 11.5 (1992) 11.7 (2007) 10.3 11.5 11.7 
 The Lower House 10.4 (1980) 9.8 (1993) 4.0 (2009) 10.4 9.8 4.0 
11. National Audit and Evaluation 
(NGAE) 
1 1 2 
50 50 100 
 National comprehensive 
evaluation  
A A A 
100 100 100 
 National audit about 
subnational government 
P P A 
0 0 100 
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Appendix 14 Changes of Subnational Autonomy in Korea: A Revised Measurement 
Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1988 1998 2008 1988 1998 2008 
Political 
Capacity 
1. Types of Appointment of 
Subnational Representatives 
0 5.5 6 0 92 100 
 Governors A E E    
 Mayors A E E    
 Educational governors A R/E E    
 Intermediate council A E E    
 Local council A E E    
 Boards of Education A R/E E    
2. Law Making Authority  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 National legislations N N N    
 Constitution reforms N N N    
3. Administrative Control  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Sorts of national involvement 0 0 0    
 Types of national involvement 0 0 0    
 Scope of national involvement 0 0 0    
 Role of national government in 
ex post involvement 
0 0 0    
 Types of ex post direct 
involvement 
0 0 0    
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Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1988 1998 2008 1988 1998 2008 
 Administrative 
Capacity 
4. Policy-making authority         
1) Education 1 1 1.5 17 17 25 
 Curricular 
N N N 
   
 Teacher’s training 
C C C 
   
 Evaluation 
N N C 
   
 School management 
C C C 
   
 Hiring, firing, placement 
N N N 
   
 Salary 
N N N 
   
2) Long-term care services 1 1 0.5 25 25 13 
 Levels and sorts of benefits N N N    
 Criteria of eligible users N N N    
 Financial management C C N    
 Delivery management C C C    
5. Bureaucratic Governmentality        
 Education 
P P P 100 100 100 
 Long-term care 
A A A 0 0 0 
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Domain Variables 
Subnational Autonomy Subnational Autonomy: Standardisation 
1988 1998 2008 1988 1998 2008 
 
Fiscal Capacity 
6. Subnational Share of Revenue  22% 36% 32% 22 36 32 
7. Subnational Share of Expenditure  40.6% 48.4% 42.9% 41 49 43 
8. Discretion on Fiscal Rule     14 29 46 
 Tax rate and base 0 1 1 0 25 25 
 Subnational borrowing 1 1 2 33 33 66 
Organisational 
Capacity 
9. Subnational Government 
Association  
   
3 1 75 
 The number of nationwide 
subnational associations 
0 0 6 0 0 43 
 The number of legalised 
subnational associations 
0 0 5 0 0 83 
 The legal right to present 
opinions to national government 
A A P 0 0 100 
10. Territorial representation of 
interest  
8.5 
(1988) 
3.9 
(2000) 
3.6 
(2012) 
8.5 3.9 3.6 
11. National Audit and Evaluation  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 National comprehensive 
evaluation  
P P P 0 0 0 
 National audit about 
subnational government 
P P P 0 0 0 
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Appendix 15 National and Subnational Government of Japan 
 
Central     Central government (国)       
                  
                    
First 
tier LG 
(47) 
 To, 都 (1)   Do, 道 (1)  Fu, 附 (2)    Ken, 縣 (43)  
 Tokyo   Hokkaido  Kyoto 
Osaka 
     
                           
                                 
Second 
tier LG 
(1741) 
Metropolitan 
Special 
Ward, 區 (23) 
Town, 
町(26) 
Village 
村 (5) 
 Designated 
city, 政令
指定都市 
(1) 
Core 
city, 
中核
市 (2) 
City, 
town, 
village 
 
 
Designat
ed 
city (2) 
Core 
city 
(3) 
Special 
case 
city  
(6) 
City, 
town, 
village 
 Designate
d city (17) 
Core 
city 
(38) 
Special 
case city 
(34) 
City, 
town, 
village 
                       
Total 
of 
second 
tier LG 
Metropolitan 
Special 
Wards (23) 
 Cities 市 (790)  Towns 町 (745)  Villages 村 (183) 
 
(Note) 1. Election for local government’s head and council members: First tier of LG, second tier of LG 
2. The executive head of the first tier Local government: Governor; the executive head of the second tier local government: Mayor 
3. () means number of local governments in that level.  
(Source) Author devised based on Ohsugi (2009), Japan fact sheet and the interview with Hayashi on the 21st of November, 2014 
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Appendix 16 National and subnational government of Korea 
 
 
(Note) 1. Election for local government’s head and council members: First tier of LG, second tier of LG 
2. The executive head of the first tier Local government: Mayor (City) or Governor (Province); the executive head of the second tier local government: Mayor 
3. () means number of local governments in that level.  
(Source) Author devised.
Central     Central government (중앙정부) 
     
                 
                  
First tier LG 
(17) 
 Metropolitan 
city,  
특별시 (1) 
 Metropolitan, 
광역시 (6) 
 Province, 도 (8)  Special self-governing city (1) 
특별자치시 
Special self-governing 
province (1) 
특별자치도 
 Seoul  Busan, Daegu, Inchon, 
Kwangju, Daejun, Ulsan 
 Kyunggi, Kanwon,  
Chungchung north, Chungchung South, 
Jeolla north, Jeolla south, Kyungs ang 
north, Kungsang south 
 Sejong City 
 
Jeju Province 
                     
                      
Second tier 
LG (226) 
 
 
District 자치구 (25)  District  
자치구 (44) 
County 
군 (5) 
 
 
City 시 (75) County 군 (77) 
                 
Total of 
second tier 
LG (226) 
 City (75)  County (82)  District (69) 
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